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INTRODUCTION 
In the present study a model for the memory representation of word and sentence 
meanings is developed. The focus is on the organization of what we call the 
meaning memory, which is part of the human language mechanism. We pursue an 
essentially psychological strategy but, since semantic-linguistic theories 
ultimately aim at specifying structural properties of the same language mechanism, 
we cannot refrain from considering these theories and their empirical foundation. 
Seen from a linguistic point of view, the model includes a set of proposals with 
regard to the semantic representation of sentences. 
As has often been pointed out, the term "meaning" itself has many different 
meanings. Generally, three domains may be delimited. First, a word refers to, or 
is applicable to, a set of objects which is called its denotation or extension. 
The second type of meaning is affective (connotative) meaning, indicating the 
emotional dispositions or reactions elicited by a word. 
Third, each word contracts circumscribed relationships with other words in the 
language (cf. the definition of a word). Together, these relations constitute 
the intension (sense, designation) of that word. The terms Evening Star and 
Morning Star, denoting the same entity but having distinct senses, form a well-
known example. The present model which we shall tersely refer to as the set-
feature model, is mainly concerned with intensional meaning. 
The development of the set-feature model has been governed by the following 
principles. (1) Because we conceive of the meaning memory as the store of verbal 
conceptual knowledge, we have to ascribe to it a structure enabling logical 
operations to be performed upon its content. Thus, fundamental logical notions such 
as set, relation, inclusion, intersection, etc., will be indispensable theoretical 
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and d e s c r i p t i v e t o o l s . (2) The model has to be compa t ib le w i th the e x p e r i m e n t a l 
ev idence g a t h e r e d w i t h i n the framework of p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of meaning. 
(3) The memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s must e x h i b i t a s e m a n t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e s t r u c t u r e . 
The s e t - f e a t u r e model a t t e m p t s as f a r as p o s s i b l e to f u l f i l t h e s e l o g i c a l , 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s e m a n t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
Chapter I g i v e s a c o n c i s e su rvey of the most i m p o r t a n t t h e o r i e s and methods 
deve loped i n t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t udy of meaning. I n c l u d e d i s a d i s c u s s i o n of 
some t r e n d s i n s e m a n t i c t h e o r i z i n g which have s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d r e c e n t 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of meaning. Then we p r e s e n t the o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e ireaning 
memory i n a s e t of s t a t e m e n t s about the t y p e s of i n f o r m a t i o n s t o r e d i n i t s 
memory l o c a t i o n s (Chapte r I I ) . The s p e c i f i c way i n which word meanings and 
l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s s t r u c t u r e , forms t h e c o n t e n t of 
Chapter I I I . Chapter IV compares t h e s e memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o a l t e r n a t i v e 
ones r e p o r t e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e and examines the e x t e n t t o which the s e t -
f e a t u r e model i s a b l e t o accoun t f o r e x p e r i m e n t a l d a t a i n the f i e l d of word and 
s e n t e n c e r e c a l l . F i n a l l y , in Chapter V we r e p o r t a s e r i e s of f i v e e x p e r i m e n t a l 
s t u d i e s , most of them c e n t e r i n g around an e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t of t h e s e t - f e a t u r e 
model: t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between what we have c a l l e d h i e r a r c h i c a l and r e l a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e s and t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n i n the meaning memory. 
Chapter I 
CURSENT PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF MEANING 
In this chapter we shall briefly pass in review the most influential 
psychological meaning theories. Because of the great impact it exerted upon 
subsequent psychological theorizing, we include a discussion of the linguistic 
theory initiated by Katz and Fodor (1963). 
In general we shall distinguish between wholistic and componential theories, 
the predicate "wholistic" being not more than a short-hand expression for 
"non-componential". 
The term componential applies to theories which conceive of meanings, not as 
unanalysable wholes, but as bundles of some kind of elements or features. 
Wholistic theories were dominating up to about 1963; from then onwards the trend 
has been increasingly componential. 
5 I. W h o l i s t i c approaches 
A. Word meaning 
The meaning theories outlined in the present section originate from general 
theories of learning and incorporate their steadily growing conceptual apparatus. 
Earlier accounts of learning were phrased in terms of associations between 
overt stimuli and responses, later ones also include unobservable mediating r-s 
chains and r-r and s-s connections. Osgood's (1968) division of meaning theories, 
which has been adopted here, reflects this increasing complexity. Creelman 
(1966) gives a survey of numerous experimental studies to which these theories 
and their subsequent modifications gave rise. In order to illustrate the 
various points of view we shall repeatedly use the same simple example: the 
way in which subjects learn (part of) the meaning of the word-form danger. 
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A general discussion of these theories is postponed until S 3, В. 
I. Single-stage theories 
1. Pavlovian classical conditioning 
An originally neutral stimulus (the vord-form dangev) acquires meaning by 
repeated pairing in temporal contiguity with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. 
pain). In the long run the sound danger (now called conditioned stimulus) 
provokes the responses that previously only followed on the pain stimulus. 
These conditioned responses, then, represent the meaning of the word-form 
danger. 
ÜCS >· UCR 
(pain stimulus) (reactions to pain) 
CR 
^^^•^"(reactions to pain) 
CS-"' 
(sound danger) 
2. Skinnerian operant conditioning 
The subject is motivated to escape from painful and dangerous situations. To 
the behavioral repertory he has learnt in the past belongs the operant "running 
away", elicited by the motive mentioned; this operant leads to reinforcement 
(escape from pain). The sound danger, if perceived in temporal contiguity with 
the painful stimulation, becomes a "discriminative stimulus", an occasion which 
evokes the operant. This operant is then called "discriminated" operant under 
the control of the stimulus event danger. 
Motive *• Operant response > Reinforcement 
(avoidance of s& (running away) (escape from pain) 
painful stimulation) S1^ 
(sound danger) 
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Skinner (1957) calls such verbal learning processes "tacts". The tact is only 
one of the procedures that, according to him, lead to complete language acqui­
sition. 
II. Two-stage theories 
These theories differ from the preceeding ones in that they add an unobservable 
intermediate r-s stage. 
1. Representational mediation theory 
The sound dangг ν that has been paired repeatedly vith the pain stimulus does 
not elicit the total pain reaction, but only an unobservable part of it: "some 
reduced portion of the total behavior made to the thing signified.... The sign 
comes to elicit those most readily and least interfering components of the 
total behavior to the significate" (Osgood 1961). 
(painful stimulation) (total pain reaction) 
S »• r - s > R„ 
m m л 
(sound danger) (proper part (reaction appropriate 
of I O to the painful stimulation). 
2. Non-representational mediation theory 
The term "non-representational" indicates that the postulated mediating 
response is not a representation (not a part) of R,, (Bousfield 1961). 
Nevertheless, "representational r-s sequences" play an important part in this 
theory. Repeated presentation of a stimulus comes to elicit a representational 
response (R ) vhich is a proper part of the total reaction to the stimulus. 
In the case of a vocal stimulus (a word-form) the representational response 
consists of the subject's repeating the word subvocally or aloud. To the feed­
back stimulation (s ) following upon such a r , new responses are conditionable. 
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Thus Che mediational response involved in learning the meaning of a word-forra 
are representational responses to the word-form itself (see figure). 
Bousfield suggests that the meaning of a word-form does not exclusively have 
to be seen as the relation between a speech-sound and a R to its referent 
rep 
(H_ ; see figure). Mainly for practical reasons (experimental observability) 
he pleads the use of information given by interverbal associations (H_). 
To illustrate the formation of these interverbal associations we shall now 
divide the process of learning the meaning of danger into two stages. 
Stage (i). Presentation of the pain stimulus elicits a representational 
response (R ). After repeated presentations of the sound bad, this stimulus 
elicits an r - s sequence which, in turn, elicits R . after some 
rep rep * rep' 
pairings with the pain stimulus. 
(pain stimulus) 
-=>· R 
rep 
(to pain stimulus) 
CS 
(sound bad) 
rep 
(bad) 
rep 
(bad) 
(S says (implicitly) bad) 
Stage (ii). In this stage a higher-order conditioning process takes place. 
The CS bad now acts as US and is repeatedly presented in temporal contiguity 
with a new CS, the word-form danger. 
H, 
US-
(sound bad) 
CS 
(sound danger) 
-» г • 
1 
rep rep 
(bad) (bad) 
-> R/ (rep) 
(to pain stimulus) 
rep rep 
(danger) (danger) 
(S says (implicitly) danger) 
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Although Deese (1962, 1965) does not explicitly base his work on such a 
theory, he arrives at a similar strategy. By means of spontaneous interverbal 
associations he tries to gain an insight into the structure of what he calls 
"associative meaning". The basic assumption in his extensive study is that the 
similarity of the associative meanings of two words can be expressed as the 
proportion of common associations to these words. Factor analysis of these 
similarity indices reveals meaningful structures (cf. p. 17 ). 
Numerous studies have proved the predictive value of distributions and 
hierarchies of associations. Here, we shall only make reference to the volume 
edited by Dixon and Horton (1968) where a great number of such studies are reviewed, 
с cramented upon and criticized. 
III. Three-stage theory 
In 1963 Osgood adds to his meaning model (cf. 11,1) cortical s-s and r-r 
"integrational" mechanisms. The external stimulus (a word-form) stimulates 
sensory receptors which, in turn, activate the corresponding cortical 
projection systems. Here, integration of this information takes place on the basis 
of contiguity and redundancies in past experience (s-s). Thus a "mirror of'what 
ought tobe'" is brought about. These integration patterns constitute the input 
to the previously learnt mediation processes (r - s ). Only at this level can 
m m 
there be any question of attaching meaning to the stimulus object. Osgood 
uses the term "intention" to describe the s elicited by г ; this leads to 
m -'m 
the execution of an integrated (r-r) reaction pattern which takes account of 
the significate. In this way he is able to circumvent the mechanistic 
character inherent in two-stage models. The above cortical processes are 
"meaningful", as distinct from the lower level, automatic, reflex-like reactions 
to the word-form (dotted lines in the figure). 
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S' »· s-s *• г s »· г-r »· R 
m m 
(word-form) (cortical (meaning) (intention) (motor (overt 
integration integration response 
of sensory process) to S) 
stimulation) 
B. Sentence meaning 
As early as 1954 Mowrer tried to apply the paradigm of classical conditioning 
(p. 4) to sentence meaning. An essential feature of the sentence is "predication", 
the combination of two or more signs into an assertion. He considered a sentence 
to be a "communicative act in which we are not transferring meanings from 
person to person so much as we are transferring meanings from sign to sign 
within a given person, within a single mind.... The communicative act, in its 
most salient and significative aspect lies rather in the combination, 
juxtaposition or association of the meanings thus aroused in novel, informative 
ways." Mowrer illustrates this concept of the sentence as a conditioning 
device with the aid of the rudimentary sentence Tom is a thief. The separate 
words of this sentence acquired their distinctive meanings by being associated 
with "Tom" and "thieves" as real persons. Hearing the sentence Tom is a thief 
triggers off in the subject a conditioning process in which the reactions that 
initially followed only on the word thief are transferred to Tom,just as in a 
conditioning experiment CS evokes the reactions which previously only 
followed on the US. 
Osgood (196S) summarizes his objections to this theory in the following way: 
"1. It doesn't explain how we understand momentarily the meaning of the novel 
utterance Tom is a thief9 without necessarily believing it, on a single 
presentation or trial. 
2. It doesn't take grammatical structure into account- simple conditioning in 
the sentence Tom is a perfect idiot should lead to cancellation of the Tom is 
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perfect and Tom is an idiot effects. 
3. It doesn't account for the fact that the predicate may be modified as much 
or more than the subject, as in the sentence President Kennedy favors a test-
ban treaty. " 
As an alternative, Osgood proposes the Congruity Hypothesis:"Whenever two 
signs are related by an assertion, the mediating reaction characteristic of each 
shifts toward congruity with that characteristic of the other, the magnitude 
of the shift being inversely proportioned to the intensities of the interacting 
reactions." In order to be able to introduce grammatical relationships he 
distinguishes associative (affirmative) and dissociative (negative) assertions, 
and proposes that in the first instance the mediating reactions shift into 
the same, compatible direction and in the second instance into contrary, 
reciprocally antagonistic direction. This theory is capable of giving fairly 
good predictions of the meaning (measured by the Semantic Differential 
Technique) of e.g. adjective-noun and intensive adverb - adjective combinations 
from the meaning of their components (e.g. listless nurse, very charming). 
According to Osgood, the Congruity Principle is also applicable to whole 
sentences. His example is The clever young thief was severely sentenced by 
the rather дггт-faced judge. He summanres the meaning interactions ("shifts") which 
occur in the course of processing this sentence, as follows: 
(a) thief modified by young and clever 
(b) sentenced modified by severely 
(c) judge modified by gnm-faced and by "topic" 
(d) grim-faced modified by rather . 
As far as we can see from this example, Osgood assumes that (I) nouns 
are modified by adjectival and nominal predicates and (2) verbs and adjectives 
by adverbs, thus crediting traditional grammatical theory. Some issues, 
however, remain obscure. Why are not judge and thief somehow modified by the 
main verb to sentence'' A second difficulty is that "modifiers" (adjectives, 
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adverbs) are not themselves modified by the words they modify. This seems to 
be in contradiction to the Congruity Principle. 
§2. C o m p o n e n t i a l approaah 
A. Semantic theory within generative grammar 
In 1963 Katz and Fodor published their well-known article entitled "The 
Structure of a Semantic Theory". This study had a great impact on the 
development of the componential approach to the problem of meaning within 
psychology. In subsequent publications (Katz and Postal 1964, Katz 1964 a, 
1964 b, 1966, 1967) this linguistic theory was elaborated and modified. Our 
discussion is based upon Katz 1967 and is only concerned with psychologically 
relevant aspects. This last limitation is possible because the theory implies 
definite psychological commitments. 
Katz presupposes the form of graimner presented by Chomsky (1965). The 
syntactic division of grammar contains two parts: the base component and the 
transformational component. The base generates deep structures; surface 
structures are generated by transformational rules applied to deep 
structures. Besides the syntactic component, generative grammer contains two 
interpretative components: a phonological component which provides surface 
structures with phonetic representations, and a semantic component which takes 
deep structures as its input and gives them semantic interpretations. In this 
way, phonetic representations (sound waves) are paired with semantic 
representations (meanings). Deep structures consist of strings of fonnatives 
with an associated structural description in the form of a phrase-marker. 
By way of illustration we mention one advantage of the introduction of deep 
structures into linguistic descriptions. The syntactic ambiguity of phrases 
like the shooting of the huntevs can easily be accounted for if they are seen 
as the transformational outcome of two different deep structures: one where 
huntevs is subject, one where it is object of shoot. 
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All of the formatives inserted into the phrase-markers as terminal elements 
occur in a lexicon as lexical items. For each lexical item (identified by 
some phonological notation) the lexicon specifies all syntactic and semantic 
properties. Only the semantic characterization will be our concern, here. 
The phrase-markers associated with a string of formatives describe the 
syntactic relations between the constituents of the string, the formatives 
themselves being the ultimate constituents of the string. 
To illustrate this, we shall consider the generation of the sentence the 
boy veads the otd book. Two deep structures are involved: 
(O 
Determiner 
Article boy 
Sentence 
Noun Phrase Auxiliary Verb "Phrase 
Tense Verb Noun Phrase 
the 
read Determiner Noun 
the Sentence1 book 
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(2) 
Noun Phrase 
Determiner 
Article book 
Sentence 
Auxiliary 
Tense 
Present 
Verb Phrase 
Copula 
be 
Predicate 
Ad i ее ti ve 
the old 
Among the fonnatives we find (in orthographic notation) the. Present, be, 
book; among the larger constituents are Noun Phrase (NP) and Verb Phrase (VP). 
Between NP and VP, which are immediately dominated by the same symbol S(entence), 
holds the relationship Subject of S - Predicate of S; the syntactic relations 
between boy, read and book in (1) are different from those between book, be and 
old in (2). 
The first transformation to be applied embeds (2) in the position of Sentence1 
in (1). Then, by a number of steps, the resulting sequence of formatives is 
transformed to the boy Present read the old book. Finally, Present is substituted 
by the formative S and permuted with read to yield the surface structure 
the boy read S the old book. Interpretation by the phonological component results 
in the required sentence. 
According to Katz, the semantic component, which provides deep structures 
with semantic interpretations, consists of two parts, one of them being the 
above lexicon (dictionary) and the other a set of projection rules. Apart from 
characterizations of phonological and syntactic features, the lexicon assigns 
a limited number of lexical readings to each lexical item. These readings 
correspond to the different sences of the item (the "submeanings" of a word, 
if the word has more than one meaning). Three types of semantic infonnation go 
into lexical readings: semantic markers, distinguishers , and selection restrictions. 
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Makers and distinguishers are the elements meanings can be decomposed into. 
Comparing father to mother, boy to girl, stallion to mare, drake to duck, one 
immediately sees that in all pairs the same opposition male-female is involved. 
The semantic element present in book, water, tree and pope, but absent from 
psychology, freedom, creativity and love can be characterized as Physical Object. 
These meaning components are raised to the status of semantic markers if they 
represent systematic relationships between lexical items; if they do not reflect 
such systematicity, they are distinguishers. For instance, English color adjectives 
only serve to distinguish between the otherwise lexically identical meanings 
of words like emerald, ruby etc. The third type of semantic information, called 
selection restrictions, specifies the conditions for semantically acceptable 
combinations of lexical items. The subject of drink, for example, must contain 
the semantic marker Living (maybe even Animate), the object must be a fluid 
substance. 
This, however, does not suffice as a description of Katz's conception of 
semantic markers and distinguishers. According to Katz, linguistic theory 
attempts to explain the complex system of rules enabling man to communicate 
in a natural language, i.e. to encode his inner thoughts, ideas, concepts into 
phonetic signals so that the hearer, decoding these signals on the basis of 
the same system of rules (his linguistic competence), experiences the same 
thoughts, ideas, or concepts. "Although the semantic markers are given in the 
orthography of a natural language, they cannot be identified with the words or 
expressions of the language used to provide them with suggestive labels." 
2) 
(Katz 1966; 156 ). Semantic markers refer to classes of ideas, to concepts. 
Thus, (Male) labels an idea, a conceptual component shared by the idea-
complexes (meanings) we think of when hearing words like boy, priest, stallion, 
bull. In the same vein, selection restrictions serve to preclude combinations 
of incompatible or incongruous concepts. 
2) 
Following Katz's notational conventions we enclose (markers) within parentheses, 
[distinguishers] within brackets and /selection restrictions^ within right angles 
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Distinguishers, on the other hand, are not labels for concepts, but for 
perceptual properties. If we were to try to define the meanings of emerald 
or т Ъу exclusively in terms of cognitive components, their lexical readings 
would be identical. Only by adding the purely perceptual distinction between 
fgreen I and Ггеа"] can their meanings be kept apart . The fact that a natural 
language, being primarily the vehicle of private thoughts and ideas, makes 
only unsystematic use of distinguishers, corresponds to their property of 
reflecting perceptual distinctions. Connected to this is a further difference 
between markers and distinguishers: selection restrictions contain markers, but 
never distinguishers. This provides us with an indirect check upon the 
correctness of a classification of certain semantic components into markers and 
distinguishers: as soon as a lexical entry is found where a putative distinguisher 
is included within the selection restrictions, we have to raise this element to 
the status of marker. 
The second division of the semantic component of grammar consists of a set of 
projeoti-on miles. As we have seen above, the input into the semantic component 
consists of deep structures. Associated with the lexical items of each deep 
structure is a phrase-marker that specifies the syntactic relations holding 
between them. Projection rules use this syntactic information in order to 
combine the readings of individual into so called derived readings. To each 
syntactic relationship specified by deep structure phrase-markers corresponds 
one projection rule. For instance, there are separate rules for modifier-head, 
subject-predicate, verb-object, etc., constructions. The modifier-head projection 
rule applies to various cases of attribution (adjective noun, adverb-verb, 
adverb-adjective) and takes the union of the sets of semantic markers and 
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distinguishers provided by the readings for head and modifier. The subject-
predicate projection rule, however, does not take the union of the individual 
readings, but embeds the subject reading into the subject-slot of the predicate 
reading. 
As an illustration of this we shall consider the semantic interpretation 
of the sentence Bachelors chase spinsters. A H of the words of this sentence 
have several senses, i.e. several lexical readings, but we shall restrict 
ourselves to one reading for each word. Katz proposes the following readings: 
bachelor ' (Physical Object), (Living), (Human), (Male), (Adult), 
(Never Married); /selection restriction^. 
ohase ((Activity of X) (Nature:(Physical))) ((Motion) (Rate: 
(Fast)) (Character:(Following Y)) (Intention: 
(Trying to catch ((Y) (Motion))))); ^selection restriction^». 
spinster same reading as bachelor, but (Female) instead of 
(Male). 
The reading for chase requires some explanation. The marker (Activity) classifies 
chase as an activity verb along with speak, eat and distinguishes chase from 
state verbs (sleep, wait) and process verbs (grow, freeze). (Nature: (Physical)) 
indicates the physical character of this activity, as distinct from mental 
activities such as think and remember. X and Y indicate the slots into which 
the readings for subject and object respectively are embedded. ((Y) (Motion)) 
reveals that the object of chase is itself moving. 
3) In his 1964 b and 1966 publications Katz does not mention distinguishers 
and lists Kever Married as a marker, although, in previous publications, 
this component was a distinguisher. 
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In order to arrive at a derived reading for the sentence , the verb-object 
projection rule embeds the spinster reading into the Y-slot, and the subject-
predicate rule embeds the bachelor reading into the X-slot. This is possible, 
here, because, as we may assume, no selection restrictions preclude these embeddings. 
So far, this sketch of Katz's conception of semantic theory will suffice. 
In § 3, A we shall formulate some criticisms. 
Б. Componential approach within psychology 
Following the linguistic tendency towards componential treatment not only 
of semantic, but also of syntactic and phonological phenomena (here the 
components are usually labelled syntactic markers and phonological distinctive 
features), a number of psychologists came to advocate explicitly componential 
meaning theories. 
Osgood (1963) sunmnrized the results of numerous studies in which affective 
word meanings were measured by means of the Semantic Differential as follows: 
"We have been able to demonstrate three bipolar factors or dimensions, which 
account for a large share of the variance in affective meaning and appear to 
be common to all people, regardless of differences in both language and culture." 
To this he adds the conclusion that representational meditation processes are 
"just as complexly componential as the total behaviors from which they are 
derived. My general suggestion is this: In a fashion strictly analogous to 
the way a phoneme is defined as a bundle of simultaneous phonetic features, 
so may a meaning be defined as a bundle of sirnultaneous semantic features." 
In his later work Osgood (1968) continues this componential approach. 
He endeavored , again with the aid of factoranalytic techniques, to discover 
features of cognitive rather than affective word meaning from the judgments 
of subjects on the compatibility of word combinations (e.g. adjectives with 
nouns; verbs with adverbs). 
We abandon concern with tense, number etc. 
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In this same paper Osgood reformulated, albeit in a tentative way, his 1963 
model of the process of sentence understanding. At first the subject reduces 
the perceived sentence to its deep structures. Every deep structure contains 
a Subject Phrase and a Verb Phrase; possibly a Verb Phrase will be decomposed 
into Verb and Object Phrase. Each of these components (words from various 
syntactic categories) stimulates a set of semantic features conditioned to 
these components. As a metaphor to describe this encoding process Osgood 
used dials which are set in a certain position (e.g. +, 0 or - ) . Every 
component of a deep structure sets a number of dials in one of the three possible 
positions. These codes are stored in memory. In order to be able to explain 
the recognition of semantically or syntactically anomalous sentences, 
transitional dependencies have to be built into this coding mechanism. 
For example, after encoding of a Subject Phrase with such features as -Human 
and +Plural, encoding of shout or breaks is experienced as anomalous by the 
hearer. 
Deese (1966), too, arrived at the hypothesis that word meanings are stored 
in memory as sets of semantic features. Retrieval from memory of a word item 
is not to be regarded "as the retrieval of a single source item but as the 
intersection of some set of distinctive source features which, in turn, enables 
the production of a single item." He does not explicitly formulate a procedure 
for the determination of these features, but it seems reasonable to see the 
technique which he used in "The Structure of Associations in Language and 
Thought" (1965) as a start towards this. This technique proceeds through four 
stages: 
(i) Collection of the associations to a certain stimulus word 
(ii) Presentation of these association words and the stimulus word to a new group 
of subjects; collection of the associations to these words 
(iii) Determination of these associative overlap of these words (roughly the 
proportion of response words which are in conmon) 
(iv) Factor analysis of the overlap (similarity) matrix. 
ιβ 
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It does not become clear whether or not Deese identifies the extracted 
factors with the semantic features in the above quotation. At any rate, the 
"associative laws" which, according to him, are able to explain a great deal 
of associative data, are, too.defined in terms of features (or, more exactly, 
of attributes). Words are associatively connected (1) if they are antonymous, 
i.e. occupy the opposite poles of one dimension (attribute), and (2) if they 
share two or more attributes. It will be evident from this discussion, that 
Deese views the meaning memory as a structure of features and sets of features. 
Revealing the exact nature of this structure forms the object of further study. 
In fact, the set-feature model (Ch.II) is an attempt towards this. 
Another theory of word memory, superficially looking rather different from the 
foregoing ones, has been drafted by Handler (1967, 1968). He proposed that 
this memory consists of hierarchically ordered categories. Each word is 
localized in one category and each category contains about 5 words. This is the 
lowest level of the hierarchy. At the next level, a limited number of basic 
categories (again, maximally 5) are grouped together to form a new category. 
Thus, each superordinate category in the structure subsumes a number of 
lower-order categories. Mandler gives an idiosyncratic example of a subsection 
of this structure: the memory organization of the names of acquaintances. 
acquaintances 
family social professional 
^ \ / \ / ^ 
b l o o d o t h e r s o ld r e c e n t p e e r s s t u d e n t s 
r e l a t i v e s 
·• Names 
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Handler does not seem to regard his hierarchic model as being in accordance 
with componential approaches. As far as the meaning of the stored words are 
concerned, this view is not tenable. Handler's hierarchic structure can 
immediately be translated into a feature structure by attaching to each word a 
complex symbol containing a list of features, each feature being a category label 
in Handler's sense. For instance, in terms of the previous example: person A —> 
yacquaintanoe, social, oldj , person B—> ^acquaintance, professional, peer~~\ 
etc. The hierarchical organization intended by Handler can be retraced from this 
storage model (only acquaintance occurs in all of the complex symbols and, 
therefore, represents the highest level, etc.). Formulated in this way, the 
model would be highly inefficient because of the frequent repetition of the 
features. This can easily be accomodated, as is done by our set-feature model 
(Ch.II). 
In this context it suffices to stress the close relationship between the notions 
of feature and set (or category). One way to define a set is to indicate a property 
which is common to all the elements of the set. If A has property B, then A 
belongs to set B. Replacing "property" by "feature", we get: if A has feature 
B, then A belongs to set B. Or, applied to word meanings, if В is one of the features 
of word meaning A, then A belongs to set B. 
5 3. C o m m e n t s and d i s c u s s i o n 
A. Katz's semantic theory 
Essential to Katz's notion of semantic markers is that they are "theoretical 
constructs introduced into semantic theory to designate language invariant 
but language linked components of a conceptual system that is part of the 
cognitive structure of the human mind" (Katz 1967; 129).The semantic marker 
is the link that connects deep structures to an extra-linguistic realm 
of ideas, concepts, that is, to human cognitive apparatus. 
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In order to preclude objections that ideas are not necessarily open to 
either introspective or public observation and, therefore, that ideational meaning 
theories lack empirical support (Alston 1964), Katζ argues that ideas and 
concepts are hypothetical constructs of linguistic theory and comparable to 
such constructs of natural science as photons or certain evolutionary events 
that are not accessible to direct observation either. 
" The linguist, like the physicist or biologist, achieves understanding of 
the phenomena with which he is concerned by constructing a theory of the 
unobservable system. If the consequences of the theory lead to correct 
predictions about the observable effects of the underlying system and 
would not do so if the theory were changed and if, moreover, the theory 
is the simplest one that enables the scientist to derive the known 
facts and predicts the unknown ones as consequences of the hypothesized 
system, then the scientist can say that the theory accounts for the 
observable behavior in terms of the functioning of an unobservable but 
causally efficient system and that the theory correctly represents the 
structure of this unobservable system. In this way, the linguist can 
empirically support the claim that his mentalistic theory of meaning 
describes a real, though unobservable, system that is the basis of the 
speaker's ability to communicate with other speakers and that caussally 
underlies the observable speech events that occur in such communication" 
(1966; 182). 
Katz^s semantic theory, together with syntactic and phonological theories, form 
a theory of the unobservable system enabling man to communicate in a natural 
language, and we agree with the claim that linguistic theory provides empirically 
testable hypotheses concerning part of man's language mechanism. But Katz 
neglects one of the conditions he imposes upon an adequate theory of an unobservable 
system, namely that changing such a theory must immediately reduce its power 
in predicting observable events. 
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If, then, the ideas designated by semantic markers are replaced by something 
else, no matter whether it be internal physiological reactions or complex 
conditioned responses, in other words, if markers do not designate ideas but 
other types of inner processes, then the predictions of Katz's semantic theory 
with respect to observable speech events will be left wholly unchanged. 
Therefore, Katz's decision to let ideas correspond to semantic markers is 
linguistically unmotivated and arbitrary. As long as we are without compelling 
philosophical, psychological or physiological arguments as to what happens 
when we "think of" meaning components, we can more economically conceive of 
them as just words in a natural language, or, if one accepts that a theory is 
a special kind of language, as constructs (but without any ideational 
connotations) of semantic theory. 
Our next criticism deals with the projection rules (cf. pp. 14-16) 
as proposed by Katz in his publications 1964 b, 1966 and 1967. According to 
him, different grammatical relations between the formatives occurring in deep 
structures correspond to different projection rules. Actually, Katz describes 
three of these rules , namely those for attribution, for the subject-predicate 
and the verb-object relations. The attribution rule, applying to modifier-
head constructions (hot вигтег, speak loudly, very oharming) and to copula 
sentences (water is dangerous, children are rascals) takes the union of the 
sets of semantic markers (and distinguishers) that are formed by the lexical 
readings for each word in the construction. The readings for verbs (cf. p.15) 
always have a dummy marker X, and, if transitive, also a symbol Y indicating 
the positions into which the readings for respectively subject and object are 
embedded by application of the subject-predicate and the verb-object projection 
rules. In this way, the derived readings for cats chase mice and mice chase cats 
We renounce discussion of the other rules presented in Katz and Fodor (1963), 
because, later on, Katz changed his views with regard to some of the 
projection rules outlined there. 
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are appropriately differentiated from one another-
Katz (1967) repeatedly underlines the distinction between the union and 
embedding operations performed by the various projection rules. Within his 
general framework, such a discussion is, indeed, necessary; accounting for 
subject-predicate and verb-object phrases in terms of the union operation 
would result in identical derived readings for oats chase mice and mice chase 
cats . However, this decision leads to undesirable consequences. If we compare 
(1) John was an employer to (2) John was a bachelor, then we have to apply the 
subject-predicate rule to (1), but the attribution rule to (2). This follows 
from the syntactic consideration that (1) is transformationally derived from 
a deeper structure John employed someone (cf. Katz and Postal 1964). Such a 
transfonnation has not been applied to (2). There does not seem to be any 
semantic motivation for applying different projection rules to (1) and to (2). 
The difficulty even increases for pairs of sentences that should receive at 
least one identical semantic interpretation, as for example John is an airman 
and John is a flyer. As a solution to this problem one might suggest that into 
the reading for airman a complex marker ((X) (flies)) be inserted, in this 
way approximating the deep structure underlying John is a flyer. But, when 
this type of complex markers is allowed for nouns, there is no objection against 
changing markers like (Male), (Physical Object) etc. into ((X) (is a male)), 
((X) ( is a Physical Object)), in other words, against the application of the 
embedding operation to attribution relationships. To take another example, we 
could replace the marker (Never Married) occurring in the reading for bachelor 
(p.15) by ((X) (did never marry)) in order to bring it in line with such markers as 
((X) (flies)). But, then, we are consistent only if we also change (Living) to 
((X) (is living)) or even ((X) (lives)), etc. 
The same problem arises with regard to the verb-object projection rule. Here 
we have John is an employee. The wheel is an invention, derived from 
verb-object deep structure relationships. We may conclude that Katz's distinctions 
between various projection rules and the operations they perform upon lexical 
readings, are not consistently related to the syntactic framework which is 
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presupposed. Our set-feature model leads to a conception of how lexical readings 
are combined into derived readings (cf. Ch.III) in which this difficulty is 
circumvented. 
B. Psychological theories of meaning 
Katz's accentuation of ideas or concepts corresponding to semantic markers 
illustrates a typical aspect of many meaning theories: their attempt to 
grasp the nature of the processes going on when we realize meanings of words 
or sentences, or to account for our capacity to find the right words in the 
right situation. See our reviews of Skinner's, Osgood's and Bousfield's 
hypotheses with respect to this. However, at the present moment no conclusive 
evidence is available. Moreover, those theorists who have in fact been engaged 
in empirical studies of meaning, all state the meaning of a word in interverbal 
terms, i.e. as its sense (cf. p. I). 
We might ask whether another possibility is available. Suppose we know that 
upon hearing the word dog a circumscribed (nonverbal) complex process takes 
place, and that animal elicits a process which is a proper part of the dog-
process. We would have compelling evidence, then, that the animal is a 
component of the meaning of dog. In describing these facts we would have to use 
such expressions as "dog elicits processes a,b,c, and d; animal elicits a and b" 
or "the oniraaZ-processes are included under the do^-processes". These statements, 
however, provide hardly more semantic information than the every day assertion 
that animal is a component of the of the meaning of dog.Certainly, knowledge 
about the processes which constitute meaning would be an important and 
independent tool in the search for exact characterizations of meanings. 
However, should an unknown processual component χ of word y be detected, we 
would only be satisfied after having ascertained which word exclusively elicts 
the x-process; if such a word would not actually exist we would even 
create a fitting neologism. All this boils down to the conclusion that, 
although it is most important to search for meaning constituting processes, it 
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is justified to develop meaning theories that are neutral with respect to these 
processes, not only within linguistics, but also within philosophy and 
psychology. 
If one agrees upon the vacuity of the claim that some type of conditioned 
responses constitutes the meaning of words, he not necessarily has to do 
away with the notion of conditioning as a construct of a psychological theory 
of meaning. But he will soon become aware of the fact that this construct has 
no explanatory power at all in this field. Chomsky (1959) has shown very 
convincingly that most of the concepts occurring in conditioning theories 
(reinforcement,motivation, discriminative stimulus) are, at best, metaphors 
when applied to language behavior. What remains, then, is the assertion that 
meanings are interverbal associations, but this reveals nothing more about the 
structure of memory than for instance the principles of electricity about the 
working of TV sets. Needed, of course, are more concrete specifications of the 
"structure of associations" (Deese 1965). 
We emphasize the following (interrelated) requirements to be put on this 
structure. It should be able to handle grammatical relations (cf. above discussion). 
It should provide a basis for Deese's Laws of Association. Moreover, as is 
pointed out by Frijda and Meertens (1967): it has to allow for logical 
operations upon its content. Various types of semantic data have to be taken into 
consideration, too (componential structure of meaning, paraphrase relationships, 
synonymy, homonymy.etc.). These constraints provide the basis for the meaning 
memory model developed in this study. 
Chapter II 
THE SET-FEATURE MODEL 
The set-feature model is a set of assumptions about the structure of the 
meaning memory, the store containing meanings of words and sentences. Here 
we only describe the formal properties, the frame of this structure without 
reference to actual contents, although a limited number of examples is 
indispensable. The following chapters will show how the set-feature model is 
able to account for semantic data both from a linguistic and a psychological 
point of view. 
% Ι. Τ h e l a n g u a g e m e c h a n i s m 
The language mechanism is able to decode speech sounds into meanings and 
іое- егза. Because the meaning memory is part of this mechanism, some very 
general -and at present hardly testable- assumptions with regard to its 
complex functioning are unavoidable. It seems plausible to delimitate three 
types of functions that run more or less parallel to the tripartition of 
linguistic study into phonology-morphology, syntax and semantics. Analogously, 
we assume three divisions within the language mechanism: (1) the word-form 
memory, (2) the syntactio operator and (3) the meaning memory.In addition, 
we make the -economic- assumption that these divisions take part in both 
speech processing (decoding sound waves into meanings) and speech production 
(encoding meanings into sound waves). Our concern, in this study, is only 
with the structure of the meaning memory, but a global outline of the functions 
of these divisions and the connections between them is needed. 
In the word-form memory, recognition of input strings of words takes place, 
as does the control of the production of articulatory patterns during speech. 
It contains phonological characterizations for all words known to the speaker-
hearer. Although the structure of this store is not clear for the moment, we 
Motor theories of speech perception make similar assumptions for what we 
call, here, the word-form memory. 
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may most easily think of it as some list of word-forms (see Morton 1968 and 
Thomassen 1970 for more elaborate models). The output from the word-form memory 
(a string of recognized word-forms) enters the syntactic operator that contains, 
for each of the word-forms listed m the word-form memory, a set of syntactic 
features. We suppose that the syntactic operator, on the basis of the syntactic 
features of the word-forms in the input string, of their order and any other 
syntactic information available, is able to decompose the string into 
кгегагскгев of тгпгтаі ргорозгігопз. It would be premature, now, to dwell on 
this notion (see Ch.Ill) but it suffices here to say that a minimal proposition (MP) 
is the simplest possible subject-predicate construction {John гз ъ%Ъ> chtldren 
play). By virtue of its connections with the memory ІосаЬгопз of the meaning 
memory, the syntactic operator artzjates one location for every minimal 
proposition in the hierarchy. These three stages being mnimally necessary for 
understanding utterances, during speech production the reversed sequence 
is followed. As soon as a hierarchy of meaning memory locations is activated, 
either under the influence of activities in parts of the brain outside the 
language mechanism or by other, previously activated locations of the meaning 
memory, the syntactic operator determines a string of word-forms which 
subsequently are realized by the articulatory apparatus. Of course, this 
general structure is supplemented by feed-back loops, short-term memories, etc. 
So far, this is an utmost global sketch of a very complex process. In this 
study, we shall not go into the details of the syntactic operator and the 
word-form memory but restrict ourselves to the meaning memory. In line with 
our conclusion of chapter I, we, too, refrain from making any assumptions 
about the relations between the meaning memory and other, sensory, memories 
(visual, acoustic, etc.). We leave open the possibility that some locations 
(perhaps all) contain references to visual, acoustic, tactile, etc., imaginations 
but, for the present purpose, this is not essential. We are concerned with 
intensional rather than denotative and connotative meaning (cf. p. 23). 
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5 2. The s t r u c t u r e of t h e m e a n i n g memory 
The meaning memory consists of a large number of memory locations. Each of these 
locations contains several kinds of information. We shall discuss their nature 
and function under separate headings. For proposes of illustration, we shall 
often use the sentence Pascal invented the calculator. 
1. Memory locations containing identical set-indicating labels belong to the 
вате set. 
The meaning of a word can be represented as a bundle or set of components 
(features). Among the semantic features of Pascal are philosopher, human, 
French, male, author; for calculator we have artifact, counter, mechanical, 
object. One memory location (ML) specifies one semantic feature. All MLs 
that contain features of a certain word are identified by bearing identical 
labels. To indicate which are the features of this word, each ML has a 
second label referring to another word that is a meaning component of the former 
word. This second label is the "identifying" label of the second word (see figure). 
identifying 
labels 
___ .memory locations (MLs) 
features 
for 
philosopher 
We see that the meaning of a word is represented as a set of features, and that 
features, being themselves words, are sets,too. Mis, therefore, form intersections 
between two sets. Another way of describing the content of MLs is to say that an 
ML contains one minimal proposition (MP). Thus, the intersection in the figure 
states that Pascal is a philosopher '. 
2) 
It will be clear from this that we do not make any fundamental distinction 
between word meaning and sentence meaning: each feature of a word meaning 
is a minimal proposition. 
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2. Memory ІооаЬгопв optionally specn-fy which of the two labels represents 
the including, which the included set. 
From the above figure alone it does not become clear wether Pascal 
is included within the set of philosophers or conversely (cf. philosophers are 
humans vs. humans are philosophers). We adopt the convention of using arrows 
directed to the larger, including set (Not all MLs have to contain arrows: 
see p. 32, footnote ) 
3. Memory locations have activation thresholds. 
Not all features of a word are equally prominent. When hearing horse, 
one probably thinks of animal faster than of hairy. Introduction of activation 
thresholds can account for this differential retrieval probability. 
What has happened when a subject, after having been presented with the 
stimulus horse, produces the response animal^ As soon as the word-form memory 
has recognized the stimulus as the entry horse in its word-form list, then, 
by virtue of connections running from this entry over the syntactic operator 
to the identifying labels of a circumscribed set of MLs, these MLs are 
aroused and some of them effectively activated. If the ML that forms the 
intersection between the sets for horse and animal has the lowest activation 
threshold, then the animal-\&be\ in this ML is immediately activated, and a 
connection from this label to the word-form animal induces the subject to pronounce 
3) the word animal 
3
^ In this description we have neglected the fact that horses as a noun has several 
submeamngs (senses) and that there exists a verb to horse, too. Generally, 
in order to account for the obvious fact that one sense of a word is 
activated before other ones, we can invoke differences between momentary 
activation thresholds of MLs of different sences. The same principle can apply 
to the sets of syntactic features within the syntactic operator Of course, 
when a word is embedded in a sentence additional svntactic constraints prevail, 
which is a totally different matter. 
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We may note here that, although there is only one activation threshold 
associated with an ML, the probability of retrieving animal as a response to 
horse is not necessarily equal to the chance that hopee is given as the first 
response to the stimulus animal. In both cases, the same ML is involved, but 
whether it will be the first to be activated also depends upon the thresholds 
of the other labels aroused after presentation of horse and animal respectivily. 
If the syntactic operator produces a minimal proposition, which always contains 
two content words, as its output (e.g. horses are animals), then the sets of MLs 
corresponding to each of the content words are aroused and, if allowed by their 
activation thresholds, effectively activated. However, this process must result 
in activation of at least one ML forming an intersection of the two sets 
(e.g. the ML bearing labels corresponding to horse and animal). If such an ML 
already existed beforehand, than we assume that its activation threshold is 
somewhat lowered; in the case of its not existing, an ML with the appropriate 
labels is formed. In this way, new meaning components are added to sets of old 
ones just by verbal training. 
It is possible to introduce more specific learning principles by postulating 
that the activation threshold depends upon the number of times it has been 
activated, upon recency and decay. But these notions are controversial and form 
41 
no essential part of the model . 
4) We assume that the syntactic operator enters MLs by their identifying labels. 
Then, all information in the ML is directly accessible. 
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Before concluding this section ve want to emphasize that our notion of 
labels only serves to simplify discourse but is, properly speaking 
superfluous. Saying that MLs contain two labels corresponding to the content 
words of MPs is equivalent to the assertion that MLs are the places where these 
words are linked together. Necessary characteristics of these links are provided 
under the headings 3,5, and 6. Broadly stated, the meaning memory is a kind 
of wiring diagram - whose formal structure is the object of this study -
originating from and recurring back to the entries of the word-form list, with 
the syntactic operator as a mediating and regulating instance. This is an 
immediate consequence of our decision to conceive of meaning as sense^ as a 
system of interverbal relationships (cf. p. 23). But see the next section. 
4. Memory tocations, optionally
л
 contain references to contents of 
sensory memories. 
It is evident that people, to a greater or lesser extent, can imagine the 
content of a heard utterance. Whether this imagery, or various types of 
conditioned mediating responses, constitute the quintessence of the process 
of understanding sentences or whether they are merely accompanying phenomena, 
is a question we leave open. But, at all events, we must suppose connections 
between the meaning memory and visual, accoustic, motor, etc., memories. We 
insert these conections as optional information units into MLs, hereby also 
opening the possibility that sensory events activate meaning memory locations 
which, in turn, induce speech production. 
5. Memory locations contain information about their position relative to 
other memory locations in the same set, 
As will be shown in the next chapter, it is desirable to hypothesize 
that antonymous words (8mall-big3 good-bad) activate the same set of memory 
locations, but, are connected to the opposite poles of this set. 
This requires introduction of an ordering principle. 
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The figure shows some of the MLs in the bigg-small set. We might locate 
the intersection of giant with this set into an ML at the Ьг^-роіе, while that 
of duarf near the small-pole. We partition the set into equivalence classes 
(E.- E. in the figure); MLs within the same equivalence class can be said to have 
undiscriminable values on the dimension,that is, indicate the same degree of 
bigness or smallnese. In logical terminology, they engage in a transitive, 
symmetric and reflexive relation. Over equivalence classes we define a proper 
inequality relation (transitive, asymmetric and irreflexive) enabling one to 
say, for instance, that giants are bigger than daarfs. For many words there is 
only one equivalence class, so that their MLs are, in fact, unordered. 
6. Each memory location contains a space (filled or empty) for reference 
to one other ML that has the former ML as one of its labels. 
This type of information is of utmost importance because it enables the 
formation of hierarchies of minimal propositions necessary to account for 
complex sentences. As an example we take the sentence (1) Pascal invented the 
calculator that can be paraphrased to (2) Pascal in (was) the inventor of the calculator 
and (3) The calculator is (was) an invention of Pascal . From (2) and (3) we see 
that (1) contains, among others, the MPs (a) Pascal-inventor and (b) calculator-
invention. Both of them express the inclusion of an element (subset) under a set. 
This, however, does not exhaust the meaning of (I); what has to be added is a 
relation (in logical sence) between the elements of the sets . 
5) For a discussion of the linguistic acceptability of this notion, see Ch. III. 
We disregard tense, number, etc. (cf. p. 40, footnote). 
Throughout this study, we use the logical term relation in the sense of a 
two-place relation. Examples: X is the father of J, X died in the year Y, 
X bought flowers from Y, etc. (X is the author of Les Pensées would be a one-
place relation.) 
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We now hypothesize that (1) requires a third ML, (c), that receive labels 
referring to (a) and (b). At the same time, the empty spaces in (a) and (b) 
are both filled with the symbol (c), which indicates that they are labels 
of ML (c). The following two figures picture this process: 
inventors 
(1) 
inventions 
— , Pascal, 
(a) 
(с) 
t 
(b) 
·--, calaulator,-
(a) (b) 
(2) •<Z> I-or I-ion 
(c) 
с/Го\)а. 
'О 
8) From the latter figure we see that (c) remains with an empty space, so 
that it can serve, in turn, as a label for one other ML. In this way, complicated 
hierarchies of MLs (MPs) can be built up. In chapter III we shall discuss 
how various kinds of linguistic constructions are analysable into such hierarchies 
8) Because MLs where a two-place relation has been stored, do not specify the 
inclusion of one set under another, they do not contain the arrow-symbol 
(cf. ρ . 28). We assume that all other MLs indicate inclusion-relationships 
and, therefore, have arrows pointing to the including set. 
In the following chapters we shall use "storage schemes" to picture the 
hypothesized MLs and their interrelations. Sets are represented by continuous 
lines, MLs by intersecting lines, cross-reference between MLs by dotted lines. 
E.g. the storage scheme for (I): 
Pascal inventor invention calculator 
That the crosses are asymmetric» is connected to the postulated ordering of 
MLs in many sets. 
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In this context we shall only note that letting MLs be labels for other MLs 
constitutes a recursive principle making possible the generation of an infinite 
number of sentences and imposing no upper limit to their lenght. 
In the next two chapters we shall investigate the extent to which the set-
feature model provides plausible accounts for meaning, both from linguistic and 
psychological points of view. The last chapter will be devoted to experimental 
tests of a number of hypotheses that can be derived from this model but are 
incompatible with some alternative theories. 

Chapter III 
LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES AND THE SET-FEATURE MODEL 
In this chapter we describe the analysis of various types of linguistic 
constructions into hierarchies of minimal propositions. Our proposals concerning 
these hierarchies, primarily required for the derivation of experimentally 
testable hypotheses from the set-feature model as a performance model, may be 
considered a set of statements about the semantic representation of sentences as 
part of linguistic theory. This implies that competence data constrain the 
range of possible alternative proposals and also may provide evidence pro or 
contra . However,the main object of this study is collecting performance 
evidence in support of the set-feature model. We assume that the semantic 
representations outlined below are tenable from a linguistic point of view; 
supplying detailed competence data in support of this assumption, however, should 
form the object of further study. 
§ 1. JV о u η s j p r o n o u n s and a r t i c l e s 
Nouns can be said to denote two different collections of objects: (a) the 
whole collection of objects to which the noun applies, and (b) an element or 
subject of this collection. The former case may be termed generic use (cars are 
Vehiclesj water is a liquid, a horse is an animal), the latter one particular 
use (the car is out of order, the water is rising, I sou a horse). It goes 
without saying that this distinction does not apply to proper names referring 
to individual entities (Homer, Venus, Fido). As is shown by the examples, generic 
or particular use of nouns is indicated by the article in combination with singular 
and plural forms. Without entering into the details, we assume that the syntactic 
operator determines the way a certain input-noun is used. In cases of particular 
By performance we mean language behaviour, by competence the underlying system 
of linguistic rules and relations (Lyons 1968; 52). 
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f u n c t i o n of t h i s noun, the s y n t a c t i c o p e r a t o r a r o u s e s a s e t of MLs which 
i n t e r s e c t s the s e t of MLs a roused when the same noun has g e n e r i c f u n c t i o n . 
car oar 
(generic) ^ ^ ' ( p a r t i c u l a r ) 
/ \ 
The arrow in the figure indicates that, of the two intersecting sets, ear 
(generic) is the including, ear (particular) the included set. This proposal 
is in line with our general treatment of "lower" concepts as belonging to the 
set of features of "higher" concepts(cf. p. 27). When, in normal connected 
discourse, a new instance of the collection of ears is introduced, the syntactic 
operator builds up a new set of MLs and assigns, to this set, all that is asserted 
about this ear; thus, not to the "generic" set. 
By means of (personal, demonstrative, possesive etc.) pronouns it is possible to 
refer to preceding or following nouns and phrases (the burgler broke into the 
villa; he... or-.it... ) . Pronouns also can serve to add semantic features to a 
foregoing noun(-phrase), e.g. if this noun is unmarked as male or female (... my 
neighbour; she... ; cf. McCawley 1968). It is difficult to explain these facts in 
terms of the framework of our model as outlined in the previous chapter, because 
additional short-term memories have to be postulated. Pronouns are borderline 
cases between syntax and semantics, and a complete account presupposes elaboration 
of the presently unknown structure of the syntactic operator. We confine ourselves 
to remarking that pronouns do not have straightforward connections to sets of the 
meaning memory and, in the process of syntactic analysis, are somehow replaced 
by the nouns or noun-phrases they refer to (sometimes adding markers, such as 
male or female). 
We conclude this section with some general remarks about synonymy, homonyray 
and polysemy. We assume that each of the readings (cf. p. 12) of a homonymous 
or polysemous word-form is represented by a separate set of MLs in the meaning 
memory. Thus, the word-form bait is connected with one set for the reading which 
includes the feature globular, with one for ball as a social activity, and perhaps, 
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with still other ones. It would be premature, here, to outline a mechanism that 
determines which of the ML sets connected to a particular homonymous or polysetnous 
word-form is aroused in a given context (cf. The boy is playing with the ball 
and The girls visited the ball. (See Katz and Fodor (1963) for the notion of 
selection restriction.) As for synonymy, synonymous words are different word-forms 
which, via the syntactic operator, arouse the same set of MLs in the meaning memory. 
S 2. V e г Ъ s 
Our assumption that MLs may be labels for other MLs enables us to introduce 
relations between elements of the same or different sets (cf. p. 3]). Using the 
traditional term modification, we could say that in a minimal proposition a word 
A is modified by another word В and vice-versa. In the same way, an ML into 
which a relation has been stored, represents a minimal proposition, but, here, the 
• · 2) 
modifiers are not single words, but two minimal propositions. 
Transitive verbs express relations between two noun-phrases, between their 
subject and object. As indications for the sets involved in those relations, two 
transformational forms are available: present and past participles. For example, 
we represent John kills Bill and Bill is killed by John by the following MPs: 
MP.: John-killing, MP : Bill-killed, MP,: MP^ - MPg. Many verbs allow another 
pair of derivatives which may serve as set indicators: inventor-invention, 
employer- employee, writer- writing, producer- product. Intransitive verbs only 
require one MP and,thus, one set-indicating participle form {John laughed — ) 
MP: John — laughing ; for the implications of this analysis of verb-constructions 
with regard to constituent structure, see p. 61). 
Syntactically little related but synonymous constructions such as I liked the 
play and The play pleased me (Chomsky 1965) can easily be handled by taking into 
account the synonymy of the participles liking and pleased on the one hand, 
2) . . . . 
We use the term modification in a sense different from, but related to the 
traditional one. 
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and of liked and pleasing on the other. The MPs involved can be represented by MP. 
I - liking (pleased), MP.: play - liked (pleasing), MP : Ml' - MP.. A similar 
phenomenon has been observed in connection with many indirect objects: John sold 
the book to Bill has the same meaning as Bill bought the book from John. 
The following MP hierarchy represents this pair of sentences 3). 
John seller 
(0. 
(4) 
book sold (bought) Bill buyer X 
( 2 ) / / \ (3). 
(5) 
Verbs like to marry, to resemble show the particular property that their subjects 
and objects are interchangeable without alteration of sentence meaning (John 
married Mai>y vs. Mary married John). These verbs express symmetrical relations. 
This property is reflected in MP hierarchies by the inclusion of both subject and 
object under one unordered set. 
John 
married 
The verbs to be and to have require special consideration. Lyons (1968; 389) 
distinguishes between four functions of to be: 
(1) existential (God is; There are lions in Africa) 
(2) identifying (That man is John) 
(3) attributive (Apples are sweet; Catholics are Christians) 
(4) locative (including temporal) (John was in Central Park; The demonstration 
is on Sunday). 
3) 
It is characteristic for indirect objects that an alternative MP,: MP, - MP, 
is equally plausible. We did not meet this difficulty for other types of 
prepositional phrases (p. 42). 
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He summarizes the status of this verb as "a grammatical element, devoid of 
meaning, which serves only to 'carry' the markers of tense, mood and aspect in 
the surface structure of sentences". In line with this conclusion we propose one 
MP for (the simplest possible) sentences with be as identifying or attributive 
(apples are sweet —} MP: apples - sweet). Existential be -constructions require 
an MP: (subject) - existing. For a discussion of prepositional complements in 
these as well as in locative constructions we refer to 5 4. 
As Lyons (1967, 1968) points out, have as a main verb and, in general, possessive 
constructions are often used as locatives: J have the book (with me, at home); 
Where is the book? John has it; the number of this page. These cases may be 
treated as prepositions when it is unambiguously clear for which prepostion have 
has been substituted. But, this is not always so: from Houses have rooms and 
Houses have chimneys we see that the subject of have only indicates a broad 
localization which leaves unmarked the actual spatial relationship (in, upon 
houses). For these instances we propose the following hierarchy: MP.: (subject) -
loaalization, MP.: (object) - localized, MP,: ΜΡ
η
 - MP . The genuine possessive 
meaning of have probably requires different analysis, e.g. in terms of possess, 
own, but, admittedly, the transition from locative to possessive functions is 
not clearly marked. 
Our decision not to assign a separate set of MLs to the verb be may be extended 
to the verb have. When we inspect the MLs which have two other MLs as their labels 
(mostly indicated by MP,: MP - MP ), we see that these MLs can always be 
considered semantic representations of "possessive" constructions, that is, they 
might be replaced by have, of or genitive in surface structure. E.g. the 
hierarchy MP.: John - employer, MP : Bill - employee, MP,: MP^ - MP for John 
employs Bill corresponds to the - akward and redundant - sentence John as an 
employer has Bill as an employee, or, preferably, John is Bill's employer and 
still other possessive paraphrases. This means that, exept in cases of haoe as 
possessive and as locative (see above), have expresses the fact that two MPs 
engage in a relation (in logical sense), whereas be, (exept be as existential), 
expresses the intersection of two sets of MLs. This conception of have-
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constructions simplifies the analysis of various other constructions (e.g. verb-
adverb, p. 47) to a considerable extent. 
Questions and imperatives are sentences implicitly containing the verbs to 
question and to order (.Come! vs. I order you to cornei cf.Lakoff, in press.) 
This leads to the following MP hierarchies for Come! and Does he acme? 
respectively *). 
Come 
I ordering ordered 
I / \ 
you aomtng 
I questioning Questioned 
У 
Does he есдае? / \ 
he aoming 
4) The MPs: I - (verb) ing are not necessary and may be deleted (together with 
the MPs at the bottom of both figures. 
For similar proposals with respect to sentences containing the negation 
element not, see § 4. A complete account of verb constructions should include 
the aspects of tense and mood, model auxiliaries etc. For the present moment 
we leave them out of consideration but hypothesize that they might be represented 
in some way analogous to questions and imperatives. 
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§3. A d j e c t i v e s 
Polarity and dimensionality are pregnant characteristics of adjectives and form 
the basis for comparative constructions (Bierwisch 1967; Campbell and Wales 1969). 
Any meaning memory model should somehow assign a closer connection between 
antonym pairs such as wet - dry or high - lew than between wet and high or dry 
and tow. How this is done in the set-feature model has been presented at p.30-31 
and need not be repeated here. 
We distinguish between two basic comparative constructions: equivalence and 
inequality. Equivalence is in order when the compared noun phrases intersect the 
ML set corresponding to the antonym pair in the same equivalence class. 
This can be expressed by the as....as construction: Л is as big as B. In cases 
of inequality, the intersection is located in different equivalence classes. Here 
the than - construction is in place: A is bigger than В or В is smaller than A 
(see figure). 
big · • small 
Superlatives are special cases of inequality: A is bigger than В is transforma­
tionally related to Of A and B, A is biggest. The proposition phrase Of... may 
be deleted but is always presupposed: I am the greatest (of all people, boxers). 
Implicit comparatives are provided by John is tall which may be paraphrased into 
John is tall for a man or John is a man taller than the average man (Bierwisch 
1967): "a" 
tall- • short (small) 
ή 2 LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES AND THE SET-FEATURE MODEL 
Adjectives as well as relative clauses have either a restrictive (attributive) 
or nonrestrictive (appositive) function. In The naughty children were •punished, 
naughty is appositive when the speaker intends to say that the whole collection 
of children was punished; it is restrictive when not all of the children but only 
the naughty ones received punishment. Sentences containing an appositive adjective 
can be paraphrased into two coordinated sentences: The ahilaren were naughty; 
the ehildren were punished. This possibility does not exist for restrictive 
adjectives. The following figures show the MP hierarchies. 
the children naughty 
Ж 
restrictive / \ \
 punished 
the children naughty 
punished 
appositive 
§4. p r e p o s i t i o n s j con j u n c t i o n s , a d v e r b e and 
q u a n t i f i e r s 
Prepositions and conjunctions have a common characteristic: thçy do not arouse 
just one set of MLs in the meaning memory, but two sets simultaneously. In 
this respect they resemble transitive verbs (§ 2) that are connected to the sets 
corresponding to present and past participle forms and thus express two-place 
relation between subject and object. 
Prepositions, too, express relations. In order to substantiate this view we 
may point out the frequent possibility of paraphrasing prepositional phrases 
into transitive verb constructions: 
(1) There is water in the bottle — The bottle contains water 
(2) John eats with a spoon - John uses a spoon to eat (Lakoff 1968) 
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(2) John eats with a spoon — John uses a spoon to eat (Lakoff 1968) 
(3) The houses of my father — The houses onmed by my father 
(4) The cafe opposite the police office — The café facing the police office 
(5) That book is about some unsolved problems — That book treats... 
Although, perhaps, the pairs are not completely synonymous, they readily demonstrate 
the relational property of prepositions. Therefore, the MP hierarchy for 
prepositions has to be formally identical to that for transitive verbs. 
Sentence pairs (I) and (2) are represented as follows: 
the bottle сопіагпгпо contained water 
(1) 
John eating 
with 
using used a spoon 
(2) 
In many cases, the choice of a transitive verb expressing exactly the relation 
intended by the preposition will be either impossible or arbitrary (e.g. on, 
under). Because of this, we shall delete such paraphrases and confine ourselves 
to just with^ and Mith„ or in- and in^ as indications of the pair of sets 
simultaneously aroused by the syntactic operator upon presentation of a pre­
position. In order to account for the synonymy of in„ and contained (content) 
or with1 and using we assume that the syntactic operator assigns the members 
of each pair to the same set of MLs 
It will be clear that not only the digits 1 and 2, but also the present post 
participles are just convenient marks. For instance, we do not assume that the 
syntactic operator, in effect carries out transformations yielding the 
participle forms of input-verbs. Instead, transitive verbs (and prepositions) 
are connected to two sets and differ in this respect from other word-classes, 
e.g. nouns and adjectives, nouns, that activate only one set. 
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Synonymy is also exemplified by the sets corresponding to before and after, 
over and under, where we have to assume that before, (of time) and after are 
identical to after and before1 respectively. From the obvious connections 
between before (of time) and earlier than at the one hand, and 
between after and later than at the other we have to conclude that before^ 
(= after-) and after7 (= before.) actually arouse opposite poles of the same set. 
See the MP hierarchy for John arrived before Bill: 
early • 
(before =afterp) 
late 
(aftpr =before.) 
Subordinating conjunctions (because, after, if, but not that)aTe handled in 
essentially the same way as prepositions (or transite verbs: because expresses 
the same relation as to cause, if as to condition etc.). The coordinating 
conjunction but, mostly expressing the symmetrical relation opposite to, also 
its in with this scheme. The conjunction that does not receive a separate 
semantic representation; see the hierarchy for I sou that Bill arrived: 
Bill arrivino 
I seeing seen 
And and or show more complicated patterns of use. We do not consider cases 
where and just replaces stop or semicolon (John went home and...and). Next, we 
distinguish between (conjunction or disjunction of) factual statements and 
generalizing statements. Examples of the former kind are (Either) I stay, or 
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I go home, (Both) John and Bill are sleeping. Such cases of explicit (stressed) 
conjunction or disjunction require subsumption of the coordinated propositions 
under sets denotable with joint and disjoint (ineompatible) respectively: 
sleeping John 
' ,Bill 
joint · 
In generalizing statements, and and or are often interchangable (Lakoff, in press). 
During his vacations John always visited Rome { , ) Paris, is open to three 
readings: (I) with and: John visited both cities during one vacation, 
(2) with or: John never visited both cities during one vacation, (3) with 
and, or : Rome and Paris form the set of cities John visited, during all of his 
vacations, but nothing is asserted about combinations within one vacation. 
Readings (1) and (2) have to be dealt with as real conjunctions and disjunctions 
(see above). The fact that reading (3) is allowed by both and and or requires 
some explanation. From (a) Children are boys or girls and (b) Boys and girls are 
ahilaren we can see that (a) describes properties of individual members of the class 
of children, whereas (b) specifies the membership of the class of children. In other 
words, or focuses individual entities or subsets, while and focuses the larger 
subsuming class. This, of course, applies to unions of sets in general: if 
Here, of course, and and or are not interchangeable. Another instance of and 
not replaceable by or in generalizing or factual statements is provided by 
symmetrical relations: Mary and Xelly combed each other's hair, A and В are 
interchangeable. For the MP hierarchies associated with these constructions, 
see p. 38. 
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Au В = С and An В = 0, then each element of С is either a member of A or of B, and 
С consists of the elements of both A and B. Without entering into further 
details не shall assume that this is a sufficient explanation for the 
interchangeability of and and or. If this is true, then no special provisions are 
needed for these occurences, of and and or. Both (a) and (b) may be pictured as 
children boys 
f girls 
In order to set up MP hierarchies for adverbial constructions we make use 
of the relationship between adjectives and "abstract" nouns (free- freedom, ill-
illness) and between verbs and their nominalized forms (the boy plays- the 
boy's playing or the boy's play). We will assume that both groups of nouns receive, 
in the meaning memory, ML sets which are different from the sets allotted to the 
corresponding adjectives and verbs. (Thus these nouns are not considered 
transformational dérivâtes of adjectives or verbs.) In the sequel, we shall refer 
to the sets corresponding to nominalized verbs by their infinitive forms 
(play, give) in order to avoid confusion with the present participles (playing, 
giving) that already serve a different purpose. 
We delimitate a group of adverbs which modify the sets connected to abstract 
nouns and nominalized verbs. E.g. John is seriously ill and Mary dances beau-
tifully are represented as follows: 
John ill illness serious 
Mary dancing dance beautiful 
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Constructions with this type of adverbs are paraphrasable into possessive 
constructions, (John's illness is serious and Mary's dancing is beautiful) 
where it is clear that the adverbs (now adjectives) modify the abstract nouns 
or nominalized verbs (cf. the remark on p. 39 with regard to the relational 
function of have). 
In the case of another group of adverbs, this paraphrase leads to a change of 
meaning. E.g. John is rarely ill differs from John has a rare illness. This 
shows that rarely and, by similar argument, also not, perhaps, seldom, there, 
certainly etc. cannot be said to modify the ML sets connected with abstract 
nouns or nominalized verbs. Instead, ve assume that these adverbs modify minimal 
propositions or hierarchies of MPs (cf. Kraak 1966, p. 163). We illustrate this 
point of view with the negation element not, hereby supposing that the past 
participle negated arouses the same ML set as not (cf. p.40 for analogous MP 
hierarchies for imperatives and questions). The figure (for John did not eat 
with a spoon) shows that negated can be attached to the structure as a whole 
or embedded at some place in the structure. In the latter case, the scope of 
the negation is limited (in the figure, the embedded negated only covers with 
a spoon). 
John eating Ä with with spoon 
''/negated 
Г- ч /negated 
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As for quantifiers, we limit ourselves, here, to mentioning Jackendoff's 
(1968) analysis of quantifiers (number names, some, many, a group of, etc.) as 
nouns plus the preposition of. In line with this proposal we could represent 
two horses as : 
tuo of of horses 
СраггЛ '
 J ? ч
 ' 
§ 5. Semantic representations of sentences: phrase-markers or 
hierarchies of minimal propositions 
In a number of recent articles (McCawley 1968, McCawley (in press) and Lakoff 
(in press) a fundamental revision of the conception of transformational grammar 
is proposed. (For a number of criticisms, see Chomsky (in press).) The 
separation between the various components (semantics, syntax with base and 
transformational division, phonology; cf. Ch.I) are broken down and, instead, 
the generation of a sentence is seen through a series of transformational steps, 
beginning with a phrase-marker Ρ , along intermediate stages P., P·.., etc., 
ending with a phrase-marker Ρ . Each P. is a phrase-marker into which, broadly 
η L 
speaking,a certain structural change is introduced by a transformational rule, 
resulting in Ρ·
+1· This process goes on until Ρ is reached, the structure that 
receives a phonological interpietstion. P., called the semantic representation 
of the sentence, is interpreted in terms of extralinguistic entities whose 
nature is left untouched. But it is stressed that set-theoretical notions and 
rules play an important role in the formation of semantic representations. 
Associated with the grajmer is a lexicon which assigns, to each entry, sets 
of semantic, syntactic and phonological features. Insertion of lexical items 
into portions of phrase-markers (lexical transformations) does not necessarily 
take place in a block, but may be distributed over several stages in the process 
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Ρ Ρ . This makes deep structure a superfluous notion, because it 
1 η 
presupposes blockwise insertion of the lexical material (at the terminal modes 
of trees generated by the base component of syntax). Also, a separate semantic 
component with various types of projection rules in the sense of Katz (cf. Ch.I) 
is explicitly (at least by Lakoff (in press)) or implicitly rejected, because the 
semantic representations (P.) are unambiguously and immediately interpretable 
by the hypothesized extralinguistic system. 
The latter conclusion may be questioned on the following ground. The semantic 
representations are phrase-markers labelled with syntactic symbols which serve 
to indicate the grammatical relations between constituents. This is necessary 
because, otherwise , The cat chases the mouse would be equivalent to The mouse 
chases the cat. This means that, as a next step, a theory is needed about how 
exactly the extralinguistic interpreting system responds to these syntactic 
symbols. We immediately agree that such a theory does not properly belong to the 
task of linguistics, but we disagree with a linguist's claim that introduction 
of symbols such as Subject (agens) or Object (patiens) into the semantic 
representation of a sentence exhausts the semantic analysis of this sentence. 
He also has to define the notions of Subject, Object etc., or, in other words, 
to give their semantic analysis. Only after this has been accomplished, has the 
semantic analysis of the sentence been completed, Therefore, in addition to 
Ρ , a separate "semantic component" is needed where the semantic functions of 
grammatical relations is defined. 
As soon, then, as one attempts to circumscribe the meaning of grammatical 
relations, for instance of Subject, it is unavoidable (1) to go back to one, more 
basic, grammatical relation, namely that of modification (or, rather, the relation 
between the nominal phrases in a NP-be-NP construction; in set-theoretical 
terms: inclusion) and (2) to invoke other words of a language to characterize 
the relation. If we suppose that Subject might be satisfactorily defined as 
agent, then the subject of The cat chases the mouse would be represented as 
cat is the agent» Consequently, the phrase-marker serving as the semantic 
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representation for this sentence is partioned into several subtrees for 
oat is the agent (and, let us say, mouse is patiens): 
-S, 
agent chase mouse patiens 
One sees now that the coherence of the sentence is lost: S dominates 
coordinated sub-sentences (S' and S") and a verb, so that S' and S" might be 
interpreted as totally unrelated sentences. The coherence could, perhaps, be 
restored by inserting the prepostion of, resulting in something like oat is 
agent of abase and..., but this only replaces the problem to the semantic 
analysis of of. The next problem, of course, is an old one: is it possible 
to find sufficiently general definitions of Subject, Object, etc. 
Both difficulties are avoided by the set-feature model: it only uses the 
basic grammatical relation of modification which, in virtue of the conception of 
two-place relations as the mutual modification of two other modifications, 
is applicable to a variety of grammatical functions, as outlined in this 
chapter 
7) We note, here, that it is possible to picture (but not more than that) MP 
hierarchies as binary trees, by turning the MP figures upside down, replacing 
crosses іУС ) with non-terminal nodes (/\) and labelling all non-terminal 
nodes with MP. These "trees", however, differ from phrase-markers in 
at least one important respect: they imply no left-to-right order of 
constituents. 
Chapter IV 
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC IMPLICATIONS: MEMORY REPRESENTATION OF WORD AND SENTENCE MEANINGS 
The hierarchies of minimal propositions developed in the previous chapter 
are hypotheses not only with regard to the semantic representation of a 
variety of linguistic constructions, but also with regard to the way these 
constructions are stored in the meaning memory. The latter point of view makes 
the set-feature model comparable to other theories on the memory representation 
of word and sentence meanings. Here, the set-feature model is confronted with 
these alternative psycholinguistic theories and their supporting evidence. 
As such, this chapter prepares for the next one which is devoted to some critical 
experiments. 
i I. W о r d m e a n i n g 
According to the set-feature model, word meanings are represented in the meaning 
memory as sets of MLs and each ML contains exactly one MP. An exhaustive 
enumeration of all MPs in a set would provide us with a complete inventory of the 
meaning of the corresponding word. In order to approximate such an inventory 
one could have a subject write down all he knows about the meaning of given 
stimulus words in short sentences and, afterwards, reduce them to their MP 
hierarchies along the lines indicated in the previous chapter. Of course, MLs 
with high activation thresholds are hardly accessible and, therefore, will tend 
to be excluded from the inventory. 
It is evident, now, that most of the sentences cannot be analysed into 
simple MPs but into hierarchies of them. For example, the circumscriptions 
obtained for clock will include not only clocks tick, a clock is an instrument 
(simple MPs), but also clocks indicate time, clocks have cog-wheels, etc. 
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The nouns of both latter sentences are distributed over different MPs (e.g. 
MP.: cloak—indicating, MP.: indicatedrtime, MP.: № -MP.). This means that 
time and cog-wheels do not properly belong to the ML set for clock but are 
indirectly related to it (via MP»). We shall make a sharp distinction between 
both types of sentence-responses and shall label instmment and tick as 
set responses, but cog-wheel and time as non-set responses. Correspondingly, 
we may define set responses as simple semantic features, whereas phrases 
containing non-set responses (have cog-uheels) may be referred to as complex 
semantic features. 
The sentence generation procedure - in combination with the analysis into 
MP hierarchies - seems to be a natural way to arrive at inventories of word 
meanings because it appeals to the conmon-sense notion of meaning as "definition" 
or "circumscription". A second adventage of this technique is its free-response 
characteristic: because, within the limits imposed by the instruction, the 
subjects are free to respond with whatever they like, it does not preclude any 
semantic feature from showing up in the sentences. The latter aspect enables 
a direct comparison with another procedure used in the study of meaning: 
elicitating one-word free associations (Deese 1965). 
The responses produced in word-association sessions closely depend on the 
instructions supplied to the subject. He may be asked to respond with one 
word per stimulus (Deese 1965), with as many words as possible in a limited 
interval of time (Noble 1952), with continuous associations (Pollio 1966) or 
with instances of a category (Bousfield, quoted from Deese 1965). Because there 
Comparison with two methods developed by Osgood is much more difficult. In 
both his semantic differential and his word-compatibility judgment method 
(cf. p. 16 ) the experimenter presents a limited set of words to the subject, 
so that the set of potential responses is determined by the experimenter's choice 
of these words (cf. Deese 1965, p. 70-71). We do not enter into a discussion 
of these methods. 
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are hardly any semantic considerations urging towards the adoption of one 
variation instead of another, choise between alternatives is difficult. 
Deese (1965; 42) opts in favor of collecting one-word free associations because 
"these are the most direct and immediate responses elicited by the linguistic 
fonos which serve as stimuli". This is resonable in the light of his general 
definition of meanings as "the potential distribution of responses". This 
distribution comprises all learnt responses (including non verbal ones, e.g. 
imagery) and thus it is important to leave the subject as free as possible. 
However, it is evident that all current association techniques preclude an 
important class of responses, namely utterances consisting of two or more 
words. With the aid of the analysis of these utterances into MP hierarchies 
this constraint may be removed. The result is not an unmanageable heap of 
sentences but a structure of words. It seems likely that there is a high degree 
of overlap between the words produced in the sentence generation technique and 
the one-word free association responses. But, unlike the free association 
method, the sentence generation technique immediately reveals the logical 
relations between these words (superordinate and subordinate concepts, relations 
between elements of different sets). This goal seems unattainable by any 
single-word association technique, if not in principle, then at least in practice. 
The sentence generation method has at least one disadvantage. Suppose that the 
following structure has been stored in the meaning memory of some subject 
bird 
canary \/'i 
ЪС ^ animal 
and that he writes down the sentence canaries are animals. From the sentence 
alone we would have to conclude that it is derived from an ML containing the 
MP: canary - animal which, in fact, does not exist. Generally, this means that 
many higher concepts will, erroneously, be included under the ML sets of 
stimulus words. Collins and Quillian (1969), indeed, have shown that, given the 
structure depicted in the figure, the reaction time needed in order to confirm 
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the thruth of a canopy is a bird is shorter than for a canary is an animal. 
In Ch. V 5S I and 2 we present two experimental studies where a simplified 
version of the sentence generation technique has been applied. 
In the survey of componential meaning theories within psychology (Ch. I, § 2,B) 
we mentioned Handler's (1968) proposals with regard to the hierarchical organization 
of verbal memory and showed that hierarchically ordered word categories can be 
reformulated as structures consisting of sets of features. The sets mentioned 
there, however, show a lot of redundancy (e.g. acquaintance occurs in all of 
the sets). It will be clear that, by means of the arrow-device (p.28 ) this 
inefficiency can be circumvented. The translation into sets of features is also 
motivated by the following argument. Handler's hierarchical structure precludes 
the possibility that vords are classified under different hierarchies without 
repeating them for each hierarchy in which they participate. For instance, 
someone who has classified a certain person as one of his acquaintances, might, 
at the same time, subsume him somewhere in the category of artists. Now, a strictly 
hierarchical system would require that the name of this person is mentioned 
separately in both categories, so that there are two unrelated occurences of that 
name in the memory organization. It would be less uneconomical if the name occured 
at one place in the memory with tags referring to the sets acquaintance and 
artist, as is realized in the set-feature model. 
5 2. S e n t e n c e meaning 
The development of transformational-generative grammer gave the impulse to 
a large amount of research into the "psychological reality" of linguistic constructs. 
We delimit, here, two fields of study: the performance correlates of (a) 
syntactic transformations and (b) phrase-structure rules (linguistic segments). 
A third line of research stems from Yngve's (1960) model of language structure. 
We shall discuss these fields in turn and place emphasis upon memory rather 
2) 
than perception experiments . The main conclusion will be that most of the 
We do not give a complete survey of the literature available. Rather, we 
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experimental data which are interpretable as demonstrating performance 
correlates of syntactic constructs, can plausibly be accounted for in terms 
of semantic factors, that is, in terms of the meaning memory representations of 
the experimental sentence materials. 
A. Syntactic transformations 
The general assumption is that deep structures, not surface structures are the 
units stored in memory after sentences have been perceived and understood. The 
hearer is supposed to decode surface structure by tracing back the sequence 
of transformations according to which the sentence has been generated in the 
first place, until he arrives at the level of deep structure. From this it follows 
that transformationally more complex sentences (e.g. passives) are less easily 
understood than transformationally less complex sentences (e.g. actives) 
transmitting the same semantic content. They are also more difficult to 
remember because, if the experimental situation requires verbatim recall of the 
presented sentences, the subject has to store independently the transformational 
steps yielding the correct sentence. It is also assumed that the transformations 
performed by the subject are mirrored by the transformations described in some 
version of transformational-generative grammar (Chomsky 1957, 1965). 
In the case of certain supposed transformations, these hypotheses lead 
to counterintuitive predictions. Adjective-noun phrases {the ved house) seem 
more easily processed and stored than the noun-relative clause constructions 
from which they are derived (.the house which is red; cf. p. 12; Fodor and Garrett 
1967). In a number of studies, transformational complexity has been confounded 
restrict ourselves to theories that are directly comparable to the set-feature 
model. A number of studies report the influence of variables absent from the 
theoretical vocabulary of our model. Of course, we do not deny the impact of 
these factors. 
56 PSYCHOLINGUISTIC IMPLICATIONS 
wich semantic content and sentence length. The finding that negative, 
interrogative, emphatic sentences impose a higher load upon memory than the 
corresponding affirmative ones (Savin and Perchonok 1965; Mehler 1963) may 
also be ascribed to their more complex semantic content (cf. Osgood 196Θ). 
Moreover, Matthews (1968) points out that the recall scores of the Savin and 
Perchonok study are equally well predicted by sentence length (rho -.85) 
as by number of transformations (rho =.83). In two experiments devised according 
to the technique developed by Savin and Perchonok (p.83 ) Wright (1969 a) 
shows that passives are remembered less well than actives. She envisages the 
possibility that mere sentence length, not transformational complexity caused 
the difference, but rejects this interpretation because of Saving finding that 
¡J?¡o-questions (who sou the man?) were more difficult than active affirmative 
sentences (the girl sou the man), although they were shorter by one word. 
However, this seems to be a weak argument because it is likely that uAo-sentences 
are semantically more complex than simple affirmative ones. Although we would 
agree with an opposer's claim that these alternative explanations remain 
arbitrary without specification of the empirical functions relating ease of 
recall to both semantic content and sentence length, we maintain that in these 
experiments at least three factors have to be taken into account: not only 
transformational complexity, but also semantic content and sentence length. 
Another study by Wright (1969 b) throws further doubt upon the general assumption 
that before a subject is able to grasp the meaning of a sentence, he has to trace 
back the transformational history, that is, to derive the deep structure. She 
presented subjects with active and passive sentences (e.g. the aat watched the 
bird). Each presentation was followed by a question asking for the subject 
part, the verb or the object part of the sentence. The questions were phrased 
in either the active or the passive voice (what Was Watched by the cat; what 
did the cat watch?). Four combinations were possible: (1) active sentence-
active question, (2) passive-active, (3) active-passive and (4) passive-passive. 
The transformational hypothesis would predict, among other things, that 
condition (1) is easier than all of the other ones, because it does not require 
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any reduction of passive to active voice. For similar reasons, (4) was expected 
most difficult. However, the number of incorrect answers in conditions (2) and (3), 
where sentence and question had different voices, turned out to be significantly 
higher than in (1) and (4) where sentence and question were matched as to voice. 
Thus, not number of transformational steps, but matched vs. mismatched was the 
relevant dimension. These data show that understanding and storing sentences 
is possible without going back to deep structure. 
If these considerations are valid, than we are free to assume that the syntactic 
operator starts arousing and activating sets of MLs as soon as the first content 
words of the sentence have been recognized in the word-form memory. The 
resulting MP hierarchy is determined by the syntactic information in the 
sentence. This assumption would have been precluded when the evidence was 
consistently in favor of the transformational hypothesis. If it were true 
that subjects perform syntactic transformations upon the input sentence in order 
to derive its deep structure, then semantic interpretation could start only 
after the whole sentence had been perceived. 
B. The depth hypothesis 
In 1960 Yngve proposed the notion of "depth" as a measure of the memory load 
imposed by sentences· As soon as a speaker has uttered the first word of a sentence, 
he conmits himself to continue in a certain way. E.g. when the first word is an 
article, then, the sentence must also contain a noun; the first noun-phrase 
must be followed by a verb-phrase. £ach of these commitments has to be stored 
in memory and retrieved at the appropriate time. In order to determine the 
number of conmitments involved one constructs a binary tree and counts the 
number of left branches («depth) leading to each word (see figure; e.g., 
the "ties" the speaker to completing the noun-phrase and to following it by a 
verb-phrase). 
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the man saw a boy 
commitments: 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 = 5 
mean depth = 1.00 
In a number of studies "mean depth" (number of commitments divided by number of 
words) appeared to be a good predictor of sentence recall. However, these 
experiments failed to control for semantic content and sentence length (Perfetti 
1969, Wright 1969 a). As an alternative measure Perfetti proposes lexical 
density (the proportion of content words occuring in the sentence). Using an 
experimental design that allowed for independent variation of mean depth and 
lexical density without affecting sentence length, he showed that lexical 
density, not mean depth, was the critical factor involved. Thus, we have to 
conclude, again, that semantic comlexity is a potent, but easily overlooked 
variable in sentence retention. 
C. Immediate constituent analysis 
The term immediate constituent analysis refers to the conmon linguistic 
procedure of segmenting sentences into word groups (phrases), word groups 
into smaller word groups etc. E.g., the first constituents within (the man 
reads the old book) are (the man) and (reads the old book). The latter constituent 
is segmented, in turn, into (reads) and (the old book), etc. The result of this 
procedure may be represented as 
(((the)(man))((reads)((the)((old)(book))))). 
Generally, the main boundary within a sentence is placed between subject and 
predicate (but see Uhlenbeck 1963). 
The psychological reality of this major boundary has been substantiated by 
means of a variety of techniques. Two of them will be discussed here: one 
using probe latencies (Suci, Ammon and Gamlin 1967; Suci 1969; Wilkes and Kennedy 
1969), the other transitional error probabilities (Johnson 1965). 
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Probe latency studies consist of two stages. First, subjects listen to 
a sentence carefully or, alternatively, learn it to a criterion of perfect 
recall. Second, they are presented with one of the words occurring in the 
sentence and asked to respond as quickly as possible with the next word of the 
sentence. The general hypothesis is that the reaction time (latency) will be 
longer, when the constituent boundary between stimulus and response words is 
more important (as indicated by the number of brackets between them). More 
particularly, the longest latency is predicted between subject noun and 
main verb in subject-verb-object sentences. This is borne out by the data 
very clearly. 
In Johnson's experiment, subjects learnt sentences of the types The tall 
boy saved the dying woman and The house across the street is burning as responses 
in a common paired-associate procedure with one-digit numbers as stimuli. 
As soon as a number appeared, subject had to respond with the corresponding 
sentence. For each pair of adjacent words (n, n+1). Johnson computed a 
transitional error probability, that is, the proportion of cases where η could 
be correctly recalled but not n+l. Again, the results were in good agreement 
with linguistic constituent structure, and the highest error probabilities 
coincided with subject-verb boundaries (boy-saved and street-is)and with the 
transition from noun to preposition in the second sentence type (house-aoross). 
Although these data lend convincing support to the psychological relevance 
of the phrase-structure boundaries, we shall show that these phenomena can be 
accounted for in terms of the set-feature model, that is, in terms of meaning. 
In the figure we give the MP hierarchies for both sentence types. 
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the boy tall the woman dying 
""Ж ж 
' χ 
the house across, across the street 
We make the following assumptions, that are needed independently. (See Ch. V 
for supporting evidence.) 
1 (a) When presented with a word indicating a relation (transitive 
verbs and prepositions; cf. pp. 37 and 43) the syntactic 
operator activates (at least) two MLs simultaneously, namely one 
for each noun entering into the relation. 
(b) A word-form expressing a relation can only be produced (pronounced) 
when two MLs between which the relation holds, have been activated. 
2 The probability that a certain response is produced after a certain 
stimulus depends on their distance in the MP hierarchy. 
Assumption lb accounts for the high error probabilities at the transitions 
kouae-aaross and boy-saved- the relation-expressing words can only be uttered 
after the second term of the relation has been retrieved (street and dying 
Woman, or perhaps, other nouns for which the relations with house and boy holds). 
Assumption (2) explains the high error rate between street and is (burning); 
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for their distance see the figure. 
As for the noun-main verb transition, we note, here, that lb only applies 
to verbs followed by an object phrase. In the case of an intransitive verb, 
production of this verb as a response to the subject noun does not require 
simultaneous activation of two MLs. In Ch.V, ! 5 we present a probe 
latency study confirming this expectation. This result suggests that the main 
constituent boundary is located to the right of intransitive verbs; 
incompatible as this is with most conceptions of phrase-structure, it follows 
directly from the set-feature model. 
We conclude that semantic factors may be substituted for a variety of 
supposedly Syntactic factors. This does not necessarily imply that syntactic 
factors are unimportant in sentence retention, but, more probably, that the 
frontiers between syntax and semantics have been overstated, not only in the 
realm of competence (cf. Ch.III, 5 5), but also of performance. 

Chapter V 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
The experiments which we report here, test a number of hypotheses derived 
from the hierarchies of minimal propositions set up in Ch. III. Selection of 
hypotheses and design of the experiments were determined by the following 
considerations. First, the predicted outcomes must be incompatible with the 
alternative theories reviewed in Ch. IV. The experiments in sections I and 2, 
dealing with one-word free associations, test the set-feature model against 
other models of verbal memory (cf. Ch. IV, S 1); sections 3 through S present 
data which cannot be predicted from the sentence retention models which we 
discussed in Ch. IV, S 2. Second, the hypotheses tested in the experiments 
must bear upon those assumptions which are most typical of the set-feature 
model. These are, in our opinion, the memory representations of two place 
relations (cf. p.37 ) as opposed to hierarchical structures (higher and 
lower concepts, words modifying one another). Of course, this implies that 
the below experiments do not cover the set-feature model as a whole. Because 
all of the experiments, in one way or another, draw upon the MP hierarchies 
elaborated in Ch. Ill and test performance correlates predictable from them, 
we do not pretend to offer direot evidence for the abstract structure of the 
meaning memory as postulated in Ch. II. That is, we do not factually show that 
memory locations are organized into sets, that they contain order information 
with regard to other MLs in the set, that they have activation thresholds, etc., 
and we keep open the possibility of devising a different meaning memory 
structure which generates the same set of predictions. 
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SI. Associative réaction time as a function of the distance between 
stimulus and response words in the meaning memory 
Theory 
Although little is known definitely with regard to the way subjects retrieve 
from memory the response words during a free association session, we hypothesize 
that they trace one of the MP hierarchies of which the stimulus word is a part, 
in search of a response word meeting certain requirements. If, after wards, these 
subjects are able to reproduce the search process in the form of a written 
sentence expressing the passed-through hierarchy, then we have, in principle, 
a measure of the distance covered while going from the stimulus to the response 
word. This measure is the number of MLs between both words in the MP hierarchy 
set up for the sentence. If, new, we place the subjects under an appropriate 
time pressure, we expect that they will produce many more "near" than "remote" 
responses and also that remote associations take longer reaction times than 
near ones. 
So far, this seems fairly clear-cut, but we emphasize that this way of 
defining distance is wholly different from the usual definitions in terms 
of frequency of the response: it is possible that two associations to a certain 
stimulus have equal associative frequency but, nevertheless, different distances 
as measured by the number of intervening MLs. 
In order to arrive at a manageable and reliable design we decided to split 
the distance continuum into two parts; short distances (0-1 intervening MLs) 
and long distance (2 or more). By way of illustration, if we designate stimulus 
and response by A and В respectively, then zero distance means that A and В 
modify each other in the same ML (MP: A-B). A distance of one ML is exemplified 
by the patterns MP j : Α-C, М Р ^ В-С
л
 and W
 χ
·. Α-C, М Р ^ МР;-В.ТЬе hierarchy MP : А-С, ? : 
MP2~MP3' M P 3 : B~D (typi" 1 f o r relational structures) counts as a distance of two MLs. 
As we already noted at p.53 , sentences produced by subjects as descriptions 
of word meanings (in the present experiment: of the meaning relation between 
stimulus and response words) do not necessarily mirror the stored memory structure. 
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If, for example, a subject associates to the stimulus animal with the response 
Vicm, he might, afterwards, write down the sentence lions are animals. But 
the possibility remains that what has been stored is not the MP: lion- animal 
but lion- marmai and marmai- animal, so that we would erroneously count a 
factual distance of one ML as zero. For this reason we decided to group zero- and 
one-ML distances together. 
The same difficulty may incidentally lead to wrong classification of a response 
as "short" instead of "long" when, for instance, the higher and lower concepts 
are separated by two MLs. Because of the time pressure prevailing we may assume 
that such responses will not often occur. Moreover, their inclusion within 
the short distance responses tends to work against the experimental predictions 
and, thus cannot invalidate results confirming these predictions. This remark 
applies to other types of wrong classifications as well. But, in the absence 
of a better alternative, we have to rely upon the sentences offered by the 
subjects. 
Summarizing, we predict that short distance responses (zero or one MLs 
intervening) will have shorter associative reaction times than long distance 
responses (separated from the stimulus word by two or more MLs), and that this 
difference also holds for response words of equal associative frequency. 
Procedure 
As stimuli we used 88 Dutch substantives, verbs and adjectives. The number 
of words per class of words was approximately equal (some words allowed of 
classification into more than one word-class). They were sampled from the word-
count by van Berckel et al.(1965) in such a manner that words from the whole 
frequency range were represented in equal degree. The words were printed on six 
sheets of paper. Order of sheets was randomized for every Sfubject); sequence 
of words per sheet was identical for all Sa. 
The stimulus words were pronounded by Efxperimenter). A digital counter was 
started off by the sound of £"s voice and stopped by S's voice(one association 
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word). S was instructed to respond as quickly as possible with the first word 
occuring to him after presentation of the stimulus word. Associative reaction 
times (ARTs) were measured in milliseconds. In a preliminary training, Ss learned 
to respond with sufficient voice volume and to avoid making any other noise. 
The maximal permitted latency was 10 seconds. E recorded response words and 
ARTs on the sheets of paper, so that Ss could begin immediately after delivery 
of 88 response words with writing down the sentences. Only after delivery 
of all associations did the Ss learn that, for each S-R pair, they were to 
give a sentence that rendered as concisely as possible the essential meaning 
relationship between stimulus and response word. The sentence had to contain 
both stimulus and response. Although we have no absolute guarantee that this 
sentence reflects the MP hierarchy traced during the association phase of the 
experiment, we rely upon it, because it seems the best approximation within the 
limits of what is experimentally feasible. Moreover, the mere fact that a 
certain hierarchy has been passed through under free association instructions, 
makes it highly probable that it is the easiest way to go from stimulus to 
response. And even if S traced different hierarchies in the two phases of the 
experiment, then it is still unlikely that this leads to a wrong classification: 
e.g. the stimulus-response pair oar-street can be connected by several words 
(prepositions, transitive verbs) but then street will invariably be classified 
as a long distance response. (Of course, sentences like Cars and streets are 
physical objects (short distance) are possible, but seem highly implausible). 
Twenty undergraduate psychology students at the University of Nijmegen served 
as subjects in individual sessions. 
Results 
The maximal number of association words could total 1760 (20x88). 27 of these 
were blanks, i.e. either no response within 10 seconds, or a response to low 
to stop the counter. 75 association words were classified as "common expressions" 
(e.g. bibliotheek (library) as response to openbaar (public), or rooms (Roman) 
as response to katholiek (Catholic). We did not include them in the final 
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analysis because they are parts of overlearnt word sequences comparable to 
single word"forms. 
The remaining response words were classified as either short or long distance 
responses. The following lists contain some instances. Stimuli are printed in 
capitals, responses in italics. 
Short distance oBsoeiations 
Tk ben FOTOGRAAF (I am a PHOTOGRAPHER ) 
TEVREDEN mensen zijn blije mensen (CONTENTED people are happy people) 
Die dokter kan goed OPEREREN (That doctor can OPERATE well) 
VERS brood is heerlijk (FRESH bread is delicious) 
GRAAN en koren zijn landbouwprodukten (CORN and wheat are agricultural products) 
Wanneer je iemand beDANKT moet je hem iets zeggen (When you THANK someone, you 
must Bay something) 
ONDERZOEKEN is een voorname bezigheid van een peycholoog (TESTING is part of the 
work of a psychologist) 
BALANCEREN is noeilijk (BALANCING is difficult) 
POLITIEK is saai (POLITICS are boring) 
Een paspoort is een gangbaar identiteitsBEWIJS (A passport is a generally accepted 
DOCUMENT for identification) 
Een HOOFD is een zeer attractief object om te schilderen (The HEAD is a very 
attractive object to paint) 
Een ARBEIDER behoort te Werken (A LABOURER is supposed to work) 
LOPEN is een vorm van reizen (WALKING is a form of travelling) 
Je NEEMT appels om ze op te eten (You TAKE apples to eat) 
Een schormei ZWAAIT heen en weer (A swing SWINGS to and fro) 
ENORM veel geeft een soort overtreffende trap aan. (TREMENDOUSLY much indicates a 
kind of superlative) 
Er kan lang GEAARZELD worden (It is possible to HESITATE long). 
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Long distance associations 
Er zijn veel .Ticcfe-FOTOGRAFEN (There are many fashion PHOTOGRAPHERS) 
Na het eten DANKT men met een gebed (After the meal one THANKS with a prayer) 
BONNEN krijg je in een winkel (You get STAMPS in a shop). 
WIELEN draaien snel als een ccuto rijdt (WHEELS turn fast when a oar drives along) 
De VINGER is een deel van de hand (A FINGER is a part of the hand) 
Bij een VERZOENING zijn op zijn minst twee partijen betrokken (In a RECONCILIATION 
At least two parties 
are involved) 
De meeste MEDEDELINGEN worden op papier verstrekt (Most MESSAGES are sent on paper). 
Onkundig Wassen heeft KRIMPEN tot gevolg (Careless washing results in SHRINKING) 
Bij een VERZOENING komt liefde op hoger niveau (In a RECONCILIATION love reaches 
a higher level) 
Een pan is KEUKENgerei (A saucepan is a KITCHEN utensil) 
Een ORGANIST bespeelt een orgel (An ORGANIST plays the organ) 
De minister voert een BELEID (The Mininster pursues a POLICY) 
Op straat worden auto's GEPARKEERD (Along the street, cars are PARKED) 
It will be clear that this classification follows the MP hierarchies developed 
in Ch.III. Sometimes we paraphrased sentences into shorter forms; e.g. the 
above psychologist example was scored as a short response because it may be 
rephrased as psychologists test. Not classified were 58 responses. This was 
partly due to carelesness on the part of the Ss (e.g. Een Іаггф werkt op elektriciteit 
(A lamp uses electricity), although ELEKTRISCH (ELECTRIC) was the stimulus word). 
Sometimes the response was nearly identical to the stimulus word (e.g. Een 
operatie doen is OPEREREN (Doing an operation is to OPERATE)). 
The total number of short distance responses was much higher than the number of 
long distance associations (Table 1). Table 2 presents the ART data. In accordance 
with the prediction we see that the average ART for all long distance associations 
together exceeds the average ART of all short distance reactions by 323 msec. 
For 16 out of the 20 Ss the difference between the average ART for long and that 
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for short distance responses was in the predicted direction; this yields a 
significance level of рв.006 (sign test, one-tailed). For each of 82 stimulus 
words separately, we calculated average ARTs for both reaction types and found 
for 66 words smaller short distance ARTs (6 of the 88 stimulus words did not 
elicit any long distance response). 
Reaction types N % 
Short distance responses 1087 61.8 
Long distance responses 513 29.1 
Unclassified 58 3.3 
Common expressions 75 4.3 
Blanks 27 1.5 
Total 1760 100.0 
Table 1. Number and percentages of different reaction types 
Marbe's law states a negative relationship between the frequency of an 
association and its average ART. The more often a given word is produced 
as an association to a given stimulus by a group of Ss, the shorter the latency 
of the response. Because, in this experiment, the number of short distance 
responses is higher than the number of long distance reactions, this law could 
account for our ART data. In order to discredit this explanation we calculated 
Reaction types Average ART N 
(msec.) 
All short distance responses 2029 1087 
All long distance responses 2352 513 
Difference 323 
Table 2. Average ARTs for all short and long distance responses 
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the average ARTs for unique responses, that is, association words which, 
within our group of Ss, were given only once upon representation of a certain 
stimulus and, thus, have (more or less) equal associative strength (cf. the 
second part of the hypothesis on p. 65). Table 3 shows that the difference 
between the ARTs for long and short distance responses is completely maintained for 
the unique responses separately, so that Marbel Law fails for the present data. 
Reaction types Average ART N 
(msec.) 
Unique short distance responses 2294 477 
Unique long distance responses 2635 270 
Difference 341 
Table 3. Average ARTs for only the unique (once occuring) short and long 
distance responses 
Discussion 
It is possible to interpret these results in a slightly different way. The 
short distance responses refer to higher or lower concepts in comparison with 
the stimulus word (inclusion, subsumption), whereas long distance associations 
are members of a two-place relation with their stimuli as the other member of the 
relation (cf. our discussion of prepositions and transitive verbs on pp. 37 and 43). 
This means that the present data do not necessarily support the specific 
characteristics of the set-relation model as a whole. But, at least, they 
point out the necessity of making a sharp distinction, in any semantic memory 
model, between the memory representations of higher and lower concepts on the 
one hand, and two-place relations on the other. This requirement is not 
fulfilled by meaning memory models which conceive of word meanings as sets 
of features (or as word hierarchies; cf. Deese (1968) and Handler (1968)) 
without a theoretical device for representing relations, nor by models trying 
to state all interword connections in terms of two-place relations (Frijda 1969). 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 71 
Two problems remain unsolved. First, why do people produce long distance 
associations at all? Second, what is the cause of the remarkable variation 
in the number of short distance responses elicited by the stimulus words? 
(We observed a range of 1 to 20.) At present, we cannot provide the answers. 
As to the first question, perhaps 5s restricted many of their responses to 
words of the same syntactic class as the stimulus word (noun-noun, adjective-
adjective, etc.); this strategy will often suppress relation-indicating words 
(prepositions, transitive verbs). Other response suppressing factors are 
easily conceivable; all of them keep 5s from doing what they are asked, 
namely to give the first association word. 
i 2. Clustering in free recall of association words as a function of 
their distance from the stimulus word 
Theory 
In free recall experiments,subjects are free to reproduce the previously 
memorized materials, often single words, in whatever order they prefer. This 
order of emission gives important clues as to the nature of the organization 
imposed upon the materials by the subjects. For instance, if the items to be 
memorized are exemplars of well-known categories (colors, towns, animals) and 
if they are presented to the subjects in some scrambled order, then the subjects 
will reproduce clusters of words belonging to the same category. Also more subtle 
determinants of subjective organization in free recall have been studied intensively. 
One factor is the frequency according to which the list-items are elicited as 
associations to the category names, another the associative strength between 
the items (see Cofer 1965 and Tulving 1968 for surveys of the literature). 
Both factors point to the role of associative mechanisms determining the amount 
of clustering. 
In the above ART experiment we found distance between associatively connected 
words to be a factor independent of associative strength. He predict an analogous 
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distance effect upon the clustering tendency of association words in the free 
recall paradigm. Suppose we collect associations to a certain stimulus word, 
classify them as long or short distance responses and group them according to 
associative frequency. The words classified as short distance responses, then, 
not only are closer to the stimulus word but also close to each other, whereas 
the long distance responses will probably, although not necessarily, be more 
remote from one another. Stated differently, all short distance responses to a 
stimulus word necessarily belong, together with the stimulus, to the same hierarchy 
of including and included concepts, as is represented in the model by the arrow-
device (See also Discussion of § I,p. 70)· On the other hand, since long distance 
responses are connected to the stimulus via a relational word, they belong to hier-
archies different from that of the stimulus word. This does not preclude the 
possibility that a given set of long distance responses has been taken from one 
hierarchy, but this would be a matter of chance, whereas it is necessary in the 
case of short distance responses. This leads to the prediction that short 
distance responses,embedded in some list of words, will more often be reproduced 
in clusters than long distance responses, even when the two types of associations 
were equally well elicited as free associates to the stimulus word. 
This forms the basis for the design of the present experiment, that went through 
four stages: (\) collections of free associations to a sample of nouns, (2) 
collection of sentence responses to these nouns, for the purpose of distance 
classification, (3) composition of two lists, one containing short distance 
the other long distance responses, and (4) the free recall test. 
Procedure 
(1) For 50 Dutch nouns, that we sampled from the whole frequency range in 
van Berckel's (1965) word count and judged to be well-known to the Ss(45 
first-grade high-school students, about 12 -13 years of age) we collected 
one-word free associations. The stimuli had been printed in small booklets , one 
word on every page. We used two different orders of stimuli. 5s were free 
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to move ahead at their own rate. We listed the obtained associations and 
eliminated 10 stimuli which, apparently, had not been understood. 
(2) The remaining 40 words served as stimuli for another group of 44 5s 
(students of the same grade at the same school) who were instructed to write 
down, for each word, three concise sentences that had to include the stimulus 
noun, "in order to tell us what you know about ". E gave one 
example (orally) and insisted upon spontaneity of responding. The words had been 
printed in booklets, five words on each sheet. Here, we used one random order. 
Because of the limited time available (40 minutes), no S finished the whole 
book; we could analyse the responses to 22 words for which we obtained a complete 
set of sentences from 36 Ss. By taking different, but comparable, groups of 
Se for stages (1) and (2) we were better able to select those semantic features 
which are invariant over Ss, that is, to collect response words which are either 
short distance or long distance responses for all Ss. 
(3) Again, we had to discard two nouns, because they were often used as 
verb or adjective. The sentences elicited by the remaining 20 nouns underwent 
an analysis into MP hierarchies (cf. p. 67) if they contained one or more 
of the free associates collected from the former group of 5s. In this way we 
could classify part of these associations as either short or long distance 
responses (not all of these associations recurred in the sentences). A few 
response words received double classification so that we had to discard them. 
Since we preferred lists of nouns for the final test, we did not process 
words of other syntactic classes. 
We were left with 140 classified free associates from which the test lists had 
to be composed. The choice possibilities, however, were limited because we needed 
pairs of one short and one long distance response which had equal associative 
frequency (in the first group of 45 Ss). Moreover , for each stimulus word at least 
two such pairs were necessary. Some stimuli allowed for more than one possible 
set of pairs; in these case we chose according to a random system. Table 4 
presents the resulting words. Because of the many selectional restrictions, 
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average associative frequency is fairly low. We listed both groups of items in 
two different random orders (one for each presentation in the test phrase) in 
such a way that the short and long distance members of each pair occupied 
the same place in the two lists. Words belonging to the same stimulus were 
separated by at least three other items. 
(4) The final test took place two and three weeks after phases (2) and (!) 
respectively. Ss were 111 first-grade students of the above mentioned school, 
distributed over four classes; students in three of these classes already had 
participated in stages (1) or (2). Each class was divided into two groups 
(left vs. right halves) and received booklets containing two lists of either 
short or long distance responses. Each list was followed by an empty sheet for 
writing down the recalled items. In the first class participating in the 
experiment, the long distance list was assigned to the left half, in the second 
class, to the right half, etc. Ss were instructed to memorize the word-list 
and, immediately after a signal, to reproduce as many of the words as possible. 
E emphasized that order of recall was unimportant and that the words should 
be written down (below one another) as soon as they were remembered. 5s were 
allowed two trials; each trial comprised 60 seconds of study and 90 seconds for 
responding. 
Results 
The number of Ss in the long and short distance conditions were 56 and 55 
respectively. Each S delivered two lists of recalled words. We computed (1) 
the number of correctly reproduced items and (2) the number of clusters. 
A cluster is defined as a contiguous reproduction of two nouns which belong 
to the same stimulus word (Table 4). For instance, when a S wrote down ruiter and 
aei one below the other, this constituted an instance of clustering, because 
these words, both being associates to paard, had not been contiguously presented 
in the test lists. Uere, we mention only the results summed over both trials; 
they most clearly represent the general picture (Table 5). 
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Stimulus 
words 
Association words Associative 
Short Distance Long Distance frequency 
paard (horse) 
maan (moon) 
gevangene (prisoner) 
parel (pearl) 
bloem (flower) 
geld (money) 
grens (frontier) 
dier (animal) 
pony (pony) 
ster (star) 
hemellichaam 
(heavenly body) 
bandiet (bandit) 
misdadiger (criminal) 
edelsteen (jewel) 
namaak (imitation) 
tulp (tulip) 
anjer (carnation) 
munt (coin) 
briefje (note) 
scheiding (partition) 
einde (end) 
ruiter (jockey) 3 
wei (meadow) 2 
landing (landing) 3 
heelal (universe) 1 
rechter (judge) 1 
tralie (bars) I 
snoer (string) 3 
schelp (shell) 1 
meel (flour) 2 
water (water) 1 
vrek (miser) 1 
koning (king) ] 
paspoort (passport) 2 
grenswachter 1 
(frontier guard) 
Table 4. Words occuring in the final lists (second and third columns). 
Associative frequencies (rightmost column) from a group of 45 5s. 
In accordance with the prediction, we see that the number of clusters is 
highest in the short distance condition. However, the lower total score (17.82) 
for the short distance group is counter to expectation, because difficulty of 
a word list closely depends on its level of organization. This deviation from 
the general rule is certainly due to non-randomness in the assignment of 5s 
to conditions (left vs. right halves of classes). In one class, where we found 
the total short distance score exceeding that of the long distance group 
(20.50 vs. 19.00), the number of clusters in the conditions différend extremely: 
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2.71 (short distance) vs. .77 (long distance). Probably, the clustering 
difference between conditions would have been larger than the one mentioned 
in Table 5, if we had applied a better subject-condition assignment method. 
Long Distance Short Distance Significance 
List List Levels 
(N=56) (N-55) (median test) 
Mean number of 
correctly reproduced 
items 19.43 
Mean number of 
clusters 1.14 
Table 5. Average scores summed over two trials 
Discussion 
These outcomes are not very surprising when one inspects the words making 
up the test lists (Table 4 ) and it seems possible to postprcdict the data in 
terms of inter-item associative strength or overlap between associations 
elicited by the list-items (cf. pp. 71 and 17). However, as a matter of fact, we did 
not collect this kind of data but, instead, applied MP hierarchy analysis. Thus, 
from the standpoint of association theory, the observed differences are sheer 
coincidence. We kept constant the associative connections between list items 
and original stimulus words and, solely on this basis, association theory 
cannot predict any difference between short and long distance conditions. Actually, 
the set-feature model is not contrary to association theory, in as far as it is 
permissible to replace the term association by connection. The set-feature model 
specifies various types of connections between verbal items: connections within 
hierarchical structures, connections within relational structures, etc. 
But all these different types may be called associations. 
17.82 p<.01 (two-tailed) 
2.36 p<.0005 
(one-tailed) 
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§ 3. Clustering гп free reaall of sentence pairs with bdentiaal 
objects or adverbial complemsnts 
Theory 
The hypothesis explored ID the previous section can be tested more directly 
by studying the clustering tendency of sentences having different MP hierarchies 
but (almost) identical constituents. In (1) Ze typten de "tuée" (They typed the 
"tuo") and (2) Ze veranderdsn de "twee" (They changed the "th>o"), the ML sets of 
the verb both intersect the ML set corresponding to the symbol too.On the other 
hand, this intersection is not present in (3) Ze typten het tiúeemaal (They typed 
ъі twice) and (4) Ze veranderden het tweemaal (They changed vt ішгсе). 
they changing 
ургпд 
changed 
tuned 
they •hangi ng 
typing 
changed 
typed 
twice 
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In the figure we represent tweemaal (twice) in accordance with adverbs 
such as often, sometimes, certainly, etc. (p.47 ). We see that, even if 
we delate the object-MPs (it), the adverbial ML set does not intersect the 
set corresponding with the verbs. This implies that, in the meaning memory 
structure, the distance between verb and object representations is smaller 
than the distance between verb and adverbial phrase. Notice that in phonetic 
or graphic representation, however, the verb is equally remote from object 
and adverbial phrase. 
We therefore hypothesize that object sentences of the above type will show 
a greater clustering tendency than sentences with an adverbial complement when 
they are embedded in lists of sentences having similar structure and if the 
other sentences, pairwise, contain other number names. We collected a list 
of 10 verbs which all allowed number names as objects. Then they were allotted 
five number names as object or adverbial phrase, so that two verbs were 
followed by the same number. The resulting sentences were scrambled and presented 
to two groups of subjects; one group received the object sentences, the second 
the sentences with adverbial phrase. This is the global design of the present 
experiment. 
We have to admit that the sentences sound rather peculiar, but we needed 
objects and adverbial complements of maximal phonetic similarity. Moreover, 
it is necessary to have objects and adverbials which fit all of the verbs 
occurring in the lists. If we had chosen different objects and adverbials and 
if, for instance, the objects had been compatible with half the verbs occurring 
in the list, but the adverbials with all of them, then the hypothesis would 
probably have been confirmed, even in absence of the hypothesized processes . 
It is difficult to find other material fulfilling these requirements. 
This applies to any experiment where S is asked to recall a list of sentences 
which has been presented as a whole. Perhaps, this factor is responsible 
for the occasionally conflicting results in experiments studying prompted 
recall of sentences, in those cases where the prompt words (subjects, verbs, 
objects) had different ranges of compatibility. 
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Procedure 
We chose 20 verbs which allowed number names as objects: 
schrijven (urite), veranderen (change), vertalen (translate), nemen (take), 
kiezen (choose), bedekken (cover), verdoezelen (blur), onderstrepen (underline), 
tekenen (drati), vermenigvuldigen (multiply), raden (guess), tellen (count), 
vragen (ask), spellen (spell), berekenen (calculate), krijgen (receive), 
omcirkelen (encircle), voorspellen (predict), verdienen (earn), and typen 
(type). The 10 former verbs were assigned the numbers one through five, the 10 
latter ones the numbers six through ten. The adverbial phrases were tweemaal 
(tuice), tienmaal (ten times) etc. In this way we obtained two lists of 
10 object sentences (Ze schrijven de taee) and adverbial phrase sentences (Ze 
schrijven het tweemaal). All verbs were in the present tense and always preceded 
the same number name. 
The sentences were put in random order in such a way that no sentence 
followed another with equal number name. They were taperecorded with normal 
intonation, except that the speaker pronounced the words according to a rhythm 
of one word per second. In this way, the temporal separation between onset 
of the verb and onset of object or adverbial complement was always 2 seconds. 
There was no special pause between sentences, but a short tone of high pitch. 
As Ss served 30 undergraduate psychology students. Fifteen were presented 
with object, the other half with adverbial phrase sentences. They were 
alternatingly assigned to one of the conditions in order of participation. 
E instructed them to listen to the sentence list carefully and, immediately 
thereafter, to recall as many whole sentences as possible, in any order. Before 
actually starting, S received preliminary training with other types of sentences. 
Reproduction was oral and started immediately after the last sentence had finished 
(as indicated by a double tone) and lasted for maximally 90 seconds. Every S 
underwent four such trials (two for each list). All responses were taperecorded 
and, afterwards, written out in order of emission. Upon these protocols we 
performed the statistical analysis. 
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Results 
For each group, we computed (]) average number of completely correct sentences, 
(2) average number of correctly recalled verbs and (3) average number of clusters. 
A cluster is a contiguous reproduction of two verbs which, in the presented list, 
preceded the same number name. We did not require perfect recall of the clustered 
sentences because their occurences were rather rare (16 in the object, β in the 
adverbial condition). Table 6 presents the data summed over four trials. 
Condition Sentences Verbs 
recalled recalled Clusters 
Object 16.93 23.47 2.20 
Adverbial phrase 14.80 21.27 .93 
Table 6. Average scores summed over four trials 
Although the object group recalled somewhat more complete sentences and verbs, 
this difference is negligable (Mann-Whitney tests give U=95 for recalled sentences 
2 
and U-91.5 for recalled verbs, which is not significant. Median tests yield χ 
values of .54 (p<.50) and .13 (p<.75). The difference between number of clusters 
is significant: the Kruskal-Wallis test yields №5.02 (corrected for ties) 
which corresponds to a one-tailed p<.OI5. (Mann-Whitney test without correction 
for ties: ия64.5; this just misses the value (64) required for p<.025.) In the 
object condition, the number of clusters is more than twice as high as in the 
adverbial condition; this confirms our expectation. 
Discussion 
The hypothesis we were able to confirm is in agreement with the linguistic 
intuition according to which the adverbial complements used in this experiment 
are constituents with a more "independent" character than objects (cf. p. 47). 
This is sometimes reflected in phrase-markers by a separate branch leading from 
S(entence) directly to Prep(ositional) P(hrase) or Adverbial Phrase, so that the 
latter constituents do not belong to V(erb) P(hrase). 
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The psychological sentence production model developed by Johnson (1966) starts 
from the assumption that a subject (1) decodes higher order constituents into two 
lower ones (e.g. S into NP plus VP), (2) stores the rightmost constituent in 
short-term memory and (3) goes on decoding the leftmost constituent into lower ones 
(e.g. NP into Article plus Noun) until the first concrete word has been reached. 
Than (4) he retrieves the most recently stored constituent from short-
tenu memory and starts decoding it, etc., until the last word in the sentence 
has been produced (cf. p. 82 for a further discussion). It is not clear how 
this type of theory could account for the present data. Most of Johnson's 
predictions derived from this model are based upon the number of decoding 
steps leading from the production of one unit to emission of the following 
one. We counted the number of steps between the generation of the verb up to 
emission of object or adverbial in binary trees for the sentence of this 
experiment, but did not find a larger number of steps for adverbial phrases. 
The required difference can be obtained if we drop the condition of binary trees 
and construct phrase-markers with three branches originating from S (for NP, VP and 
Adverbial Phrase). But then the theory runs into another difficulty because it 
must assume short-term memory storage of tuo constituents (VP and Adverbial Phrase); 
however, the model offers no criteria for deciding which of these is the first to 
be retrieved. It seems fair to conclude that the present data are hardly 
compatible with Johnson's sentence generation model. 
5 4. Memory storage of subjeot-veib-obieet sentences 
Theory 
If we inspect the following four SVO sentences and t h e i r MP h i e r a r c h i e s : 
(1) The man killed the girl (MP.: the man-killing, MP,: killed-the girl, MP : MP -4P ) 
(2) The man killed someone (MP.-the man-killing, MP : killed-Y, MP : MP -MP ) 
(3) Someone killed the girl (MP iX-killing, MP,: killed-the girl, MP : мр -MP ) 
(4) Someone killed someone (MP : X-killing, MP : killed-Y, MP : MP^-MP ) 
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ve immediately see that the following relations hold between their semantic 
contents : (I) > (2 ) , (3 )> (¿j) and (1) + (4) = (2) + (3) or, equivalently, (4) -
(2) + (3) - ( I ) . In terms of the memory effort required for storing these sentences, 
we would expect the same relationship to hold between the relationscores. 
Johnson's (1966) model (cf. pp. 59 and 81), however, predicts a different outcome 
when relation i s measured as we measured i t in the present experiment. 
In The tall boy saved the dying woman, tall and boy belong to the same higher-
order unit, but not boy and saved. As soon as a subject has produced, i . e . 
decoded from a higher order unit, the response tall, he wi l l proceed the decode 
boy. Ibwever, the decoding operation following upon boy does not generate 
saved but a higher-order unit, VP, which only after some further operations is 
decoded into ΒζΐΟβά. From this, Johnson deduces the prediction that preliminary 
training with the association tall-boy wi l l have a fac i l i tat ing effect upon 
subsequent learning of the whole sentence, but not pretraining with the 
association boy-saoed. His results confirm this expectation. Transferred to 
the four sentences above, Johnson's model leads to the prediction that pretraining 
with (4) wi l l have equal fac i l i tat ing effect upon subsequent learning of (1) 
as pretraining with (2), provided, of course, that familiarity with individual 
words i s kept under control. Thus : (1) > (3) > (2) ~ 4 and (1) + (4) > (2) + (3). 
That in Johnson's experiment pretraining with boy-saved did not signif icantly 
reduce the transitional error probability (cf. p. 59) from hoy to saved, i s 
probably due to ambiguities in six out of eight noun-verb pairs in the pretraining 
l i s t . Wants in family-wants i s also a noun; lady and sisters in lady-told and 
sisters-liked were perhaps not seen as logical subject but as logical object. 
Party-was i s not even a minimal proposition. Did, was and had in person-did, 
party—was and girl—had can function not only as main verbs but also as auxi l iar ies. 
These objections do not apply to the adjective noun-combinations (new-person, 
las t-party, young-gir I). 
Because the present experiment not only aims at deciding between the alternative 
models, but also at testing the additivity hypothesis ((4) = (2) + (3) - ( 0 ) , 
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we could not repeat Johnson's procedure but, instead,applied a modified version 
of the "archimedic" method developed by Savin and Ρerchonok (1965). This 
technique is based on the principle that in a given time interval a fixed amount 
of material can be stored in memory. Bringing in additional material results 
either in the forgetting of it or, if it is remembered, in forgetting another 
part of the material. In this experiment we presented the Ss in each trial 
with one SJQ sentence and, after a pause of 5 seconds, a string of 8 single 
words. Ss were instructed to retain the sentence and as many single words 
as possible. The number of these words that were reproduced after correct 
recall of the sentence, counts as a measure for the memory space (effort) 
needed for storage of the sentence content. 
In the preliminary training, groups A,B,C and D learnt six sentences of types 
(1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively. Thereafter, each of the subjects underwent 
six trials with complete 9J0 sentences (type (1)). If we indicate the mean 
number of single words correctly reproduced by groups A.B.C and D during six 
trials by a.b.c, and d, then the set-relation model predicts d-b+c-a. 
Procedure 
The experiment comprised three stages. In stage I the 5s underwent 16 practice 
trials to become familiar with the experimental situation. In stage II the Ss 
learnt sentences or parts of the sentences which, as they were told, would recur 
in stage III. In stage III measurement was made of the memory space needed for the 
retention of the sentences wholly or partly learnt in stage II. 
The experiment was performed in groups in two fifth-grade and two sixth-grade 
classes of an elementary school. Each class was divided in random into four 
groups: A.B.C and D; the total numbers of Ss in these groups were 24, 
20, 22 and 23 respectively. The 4 groups from a given class took part in the 
sessions simultaneously, so that their treatment was identical except for the 
material they had to study during stage II. 
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The sentences and the s t r i n g s of s i n g l e words for s t a g e s I and I I I were 
presented by means of a taperecorder . Sentences had been recorded with normal 
i n t o n a t i o n and speed , the s t r i n g s of e i g h t words at the r a t e of 1 word per 
second. Between the sentences and the s t r i n g s of s i n g l e words there was a 
5-second pause . 
I n t o t a l 22 sentences and s t r i n g s had been recorded; 16 were des igned as 
p r a c t i c e t r i a l s i n s t a g e I , 6 as the mater ia l for s t a g e I I I . The 6 experimental 
s en tences read as f o l l o w s : 
1. De soldaat grijpt het geweer (The soldier grabs the gun) 
2. De inbreker begraaft de diamant (The burglar buries the diamond) 
3. De piloot drinkt de koffie (The pi lot drinks the coffee) 
4. De dorpelingen huldigen de burgemeester (The vi l lagers welcome the burgomaster) 
5. De minister verbrandt de handdoek (The minister bums the towel) 
6. De agent regelt het verkeer (The policeman regulates the traffic) 
All 22 sentences were put in the present tense, but subjects and objects could be 
both singular and plural. 
The 22 word strings were composed from 8 clusters of 5 words, each cluster 
being a well-known category of words: parts of the body, animals, vehicles , 
colors, temporal periods, garments, weather types and pieces of furniture. For 
each string the sequence of categories was identical , but the specif ic words 
had been chosen at random. 
In a preliminary experiment we noticed that writing out in full a l l the 
words from the sentences and strings cost too much time. We therefore decided 
to make a modification in the sence that Ss need only write the in i t i a l le t ters 
of the words. In order to make a rel iable scoring possible, the 5 words of each 
category were so chosen that their f i r s t let ters were a l l different. The s ix 
subjects, verbs and objects also had different f i r s t l e t t er s . Ss recorded 
their answers immediately on sheets of paper ruled with 9 columns and 8 rows. 
The leftmost column was wide so that i t would provide enough space for f i l l i n g 
in the 5 i n i t i a l le t ters of the sentence words. In the remaining 8 columns, 
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which were narrower, stood the names of the categories. These names occurred 
in every row, rows corresponding to trials. 
Ss were instructed to гететоЬег the sentence at any rate, and after that 
as many separate words as possible. First of all they were to write down the 
sentence in the leftmost column, and then, in any order, the single words. 
For writing down the answers, 45 sec. per trial was allowed. 
The material for stage II was different for each group. Group D was presented 
with the words from the 6 experimental sentences printed one beneath the other; 
at the top the subjects, in the middle the verbs, and below, the objects, all 
in a random order. Subjects and objects were preceded by the definite article. 
The verbs were preceded by hij (he) or ze (they) and followed by het (it) or 
hem (him) (type (4) sentences). We chose these additions instead of iemand 
(someone) and iets (something ) because we judged they would more succesfully 
prevent Ss searching for concrete subjects and objects than would the indefinite 
pronouns. 
Ss of group С received a sheet of paper on which, one beneath the other, the 
experimental sentences were printed; the subjects, however, were replaced by he 
or they. The subjects had been printed at the bottom of the sheet, preceded in 
each instance by the definite article. These Ss learnt type (3) sentences 
during stage II. Group В was given the experimental sentences with the objects 
replaced by him or it (type (2)). Here the objects had been printed at the 
bottom of the paper. Group A, finally, learnt the experimental sentences in 
exactly the same form as that which they were to be presented in stage III 
(type (1)). 
The instruction was the same for all groups: to study the material printed 
on the sheet of paper by copying it once and afterwards reading it carefully. 
Ss were told that this matter would help him in memorizing the sentences in 
stage III. Total learning time was 4 minutes for all groups. Notice than as a 
result of this procedure Ss of all groups were familiar with all words of the 
experimental sentences. 
86 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
Results 
For calculating the average group scores we used only the trials in which the 
sentence was correctly reproduced. (Number of sentence errors was very small.) 
Groups N Average Standard 
score Deviation 
A 24 4.070 1.18 
В 20 3.759 1.20 
С 22 3.771 1.42 
D 23 3.412 1.05 
Table 7. Average group scores (number of correctly recalled words after perfect 
reproduction of the sentences) and standard deviations. 
From table 7 it appears that the average scores fit in very closely with our 
prediction (d = Ъ + с - a). Predicted d-value is 3.460, empirical d-value is 
3.412; the difference is only .048 words. The a priori probability that our 
prediction is right grows larger the nearer the group averages approach each other. 
The difference between a and d is, however, significant (t = 1.717, ρ <.025 
(one-tailed); Mann-Whitney U-test: ζ = 1.93, ρ = .027). All remaining differences 
are not significant (standard deviations being relatively large). 
Discussion 
The closeness of the average scores for groups В and С makes an interpretation 
in terms of Johnson's (1966) theory, which would predict that a>c>b=d, highly 
implausible, although the difference between b and d is not significant. 
However, another very simple model is in perfect agreement. A theory in terms 
of "chunks" (cf. Wright 1968) would describe the memory load imposed by a 
sentence as the number of well-integrated and overlearned parts (chunks) out of 
which the sentence has been composed. Now, the number of chunks for groups A, B, 
С and D was 1, 2,2 and 3 respectively; these numbers correspond to the пшпЬег 
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of fragments into which the experimental sentences had been divided in stage II. 
Recalling a sentence during stage III, therefore, required retrieval of 1,2,2 
and 3 chunks; this offers a complete account for the data. 
However, the notion of chunking is too weak as a general explanation of sentence 
retention phenomena: it is unable to predict patterns of cohesion (e.g. different 
patterns of transitional error probabilities or probe latencies) between presumed 
chunks (e.g. words) when sentences are learnt to some criterion of performance. 
The extent to which this can be accomplished by the set-feature model, we will 
investigate in the next section. 
i 5. Probe latencies in sentences with transitive and intransitive verbs 
Theory 
In our discussion of the performance correlates of linguistic constituent 
structure (p. 58 ) we noticed that most experiments directed at these 
phenomena, studied sentences with the general structure x-relation-y where 
X and y are nouns or noun phrases connected by a word expressing a two-place 
relation (transitive verb, preposition). As a possible explanation for the 
observation that the transition from χ to the relational word is more difficult 
than that from the relational word to i/, we hypothesized that the syntactic 
operator allows for production of a relational word-form only after the other 
term of the relation has been retrieved from the meaning memory. This requires 
additional processing time and increases error probability because two ML sets 
must be aroused. If, however, the first word of the second constituent is not a 
relational word, but, for instance, an intransitive verb, then the transition 
to the second constituent should no longer impose extra problems. This hypothesis 
can be tested by having Ss learn sentences with transitive and intransitive verbs 
afterwards, measuring probe latencies with the subject noun as probes. We expect 
that the latency will be longer when the response word is a transitive Verb 
than when an intransitive verb is the correct answer. 
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Procedure 
Two groups of five 5s (undergraduate students, alternatingly assigned to one 
of the conditions in order of participation) learnt sets of six sentences. 
The sentences were identical except that the fourth word was either a noun 
(object group) or an adverb (adverb group). They read as follows: 
.noten , 
Jonge apen eten zelden onder bomen (Young monkeys (seldom) eat (nuts) under trees) 
rteksten, rtexts \ 
Onze vrienden leren prettig achter tafels (Our friends learn comfortably behind 
tables) 
Deze mensen stelen ''altijd"' tijdens feesten (These people (always) steal (records) 
,platen, 
during parties) 
jpijpenj -pipes . 
Hippe vrouwen roken gretig zonder schaamte (Hippie women smoke eagerly without 
shame) 
liedjes 
Oude vrijers zingen 4evens 'over moeders (Old bachelors (also) sing (songs) about 
mothers) 
poker .play poker 
Slimme knapen spelen 'gaarne' tegen gasten (Clever guys Hike playing' with guests) 
The verbs were identical in both conditions, so that, during probe latency 
measurement, exactly the same responses served as responses to the subject noun 
for the object and adverb groups. Because each of the Ss learnt only one type 
of sentence, we judged he would not hesitate between transitive and intransitive 
readings. 
The sentences were learnt as responses to one-digit numbers as stimuli 
according to the usual anticipation paired-associate procedure. We used the 
maximum time interval allowed by the memory drum: 4 sec. for stimulus alone, 4 sec. 
for stimulus plus response. The sentences were exposed in four different orders; 
order of object and adverb sentences was identical. Learning went on until the 
criterion of one correct trial (all six sentences correctly reproduced) was reached. 
The individual words of the sentences (36 for each condition) had been tape-
recorded ; the interval between successive words amounted to 8 seconds. 
The words occurred four times each, so that it was possible to obtain reliable 
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latency scores. Word order in the adverb condition was identical to that in the 
object condition, except that adverbs had been replaced by object nouns. 
Latencies (milliseconds) were measured by a digital counter which was started 
by the tape signals (words taped) and stopped by Ss voice. E instructed Ss 
to listen carefully to the words played by the recorder and to respond as soon as 
possible with the next word of the sentence from which the probe word had been 
taken.When the probe was the last word of a sentence, S had to react by "punt" 
(stop). Before actually starting , S learnt to react with sufficient voice volume 
to the stop the counter. After 72 words, a short resting pause was inserted. 
E checked correctness of the responses and recorded latency times; because of the 
limited time available until the outset of the next probe, he deleted latencies 
longer than 4500 msec. It will already have been noticed that all words in the 
sentences had two syllables. We took this measure in order to eliminate effects of 
duration of the taped stimulus words as much as possible. 
Results 
The numbers of learning trials in object (14.30) and adverb (12.00)conditions 
2 
were nearly equal (median test: χ - .40, p<.50). So were the numbers of omissions 
(latencies not registered): 68 (8) and 66 (9) in adverb and object groups respectively. 
(The numbers between brackets indicate omissions in the subject noun-verb 
transition.) Omissions were due to (1) latencies longer than 4.5 sec, (2) 
incorrect responses and (3) no or too low responses. 
Table 8 shows the average latencies calculated over all registered responses, 
together with the levels of significance (Mann-Whitney test, one-tailed, except 
p< .004 which is two-tailed). We see that the subject-verb transition is much 
more difficult when the verb has transitive function than when it is intransitive. 
In fact, we observed, for this transition, no overlap between the mean latencies 
measured for individual Ss in different conditions. This strongly supports 
the hypothesis. Also in agreement with the theory is the shorter latency for the 
verb-object transition if compared with the verb-adverb transition. Presentation 
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of the transitive verb directly arouses the ML set which intersects the set 
corresponding to the object noun. To this difference, however, should not 
be attached too much importance, because the responses in this transition involved 
very different word-classes. 
Object 
Transitions: Determiner Noun Verb Adverb Preposition Noun Stop 
Object condition 1407 2365 1447 1473 1560 1732 
Adverb condition 1419 1705 1755 2160 1614 1567 
Significance levels n.s. p<.002 p<.025 p<.004 n.s. n.s. 
Table 8. Average latencies (msec.) for the transitions 
We did not anticipate the extremely large difference at the fourth transition. 
A possible explanation could be that, because of the independent character of 
most of the adverbs used (cf. p. 80)ι they are not very helpful in locating 
the sentences they had been taken from (weak "cueing power", cf. Horowitz and 
Prytulak 1969; see also p. 78, footnote). 
Discussion 
These data emphasize the importance of distinguishing between relational and 
attributive function of verbs, and show that, at least in probe latency tasks, 
this distinction has more weight than constituent boundaries, unless one were 
to move the main constituent boundary to the right of intransitive verbs 
(cf. Uhlenbeck 1963). 
Two difficulties remain to be discussed. Two of the six adverbs {prettig 
(comfortable) an gretig (eager)) belong to the word-class of adjectives and it 
is most appropriate to represent their MP hierarchies as follows: 
(1) MP : friends-studying, MP2: study-oomfortable, MP3: MPj-MPg (for the notation, 
see p. 46). For the moment, it is not clear whether the arguments we put forward 
in order to account for the greater difficulty of transitions to relational words, 
also apply to cases like (1). Here, we need further experimentation and, perhaps a 
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correction of the MP hierarchies proposed for this type of adverb. 
The fourth transition (to prepositions) is a transition to a relational 
word, too. We might expect, here, an increased latency similar to that for the 
subject-verb transition. This is borne out by the adverb condition, but not by the 
object group data. As already indicated, differential cueing power of the adverbs 
and object nouns which, here, served as probes, is, perhaps, a sufficient explanation. 
§6. D i s c u s s i o n 
The line of reasoning leading to the above set of experiments may be summarized 
as follows. First, we postulated an abstract structure of the meaning memory 
consisting of memory locations in which different types of information are 
contained. Next, we showed that this structure accepts hierarchies of minimal 
propositions, and that both word and sentence meanings are describable in terms of 
such hierarchies. As a following step, these hierarchies were compared to the 
memory representations developed within the framework of alternative theories, and 
the conclusion arose that much of the experimental data supporting these theories 
are compatible with the set-feature model. However, in a number of issues the 
predictions from the set-feature model were in conflict with those derivable from 
the other theories. The experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate that, with 
regard to these issues, the set-feature model is supported. 
We attach most importance to the outcomes of § § 1 and 2 because they imply 
that any meaning memory model must make a fundamental distinction between the memory 
representation of hierarchical structures (of superordinate and subordinate concepts) 
on the one hand and relational structures (of words connected via a relation-
indicating word) on the other, and to § 5 where the necessity is demonstrated of 
assigning, somehow, a more complex memory representation to transitive verbs as 
one type of relation-indicating words. Both characteristics are typical of the 
set-feature model and provide the basis for setting up hierarchies of minimal 
propositions. In §§ 3 and 4 more specific consequences derived from these 
hierarchies are studied. 
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This experimental evidence must be interpreted with some caution. Although the 
data, covering a fairly heterogeneous set of language behaviors, are in good 
agreement with the predictions, it might be objected that they do not necessarily 
support the structure of the meaning memory postulated in Ch. II. More 
specifically, the data support part of the proposals concerning the semantic 
representation of sentences which we outlined in Ch. Ill, but this does not imply 
that the memory organization of Ch. II is the only one compatible with these semantic 
representations. This necessitates experimentation aiming more directly at the 
postulated meaning memory structure. 
Further research will also have to deal with the following issues. First, the 
hierarchies of minimal propositions elaborated in Ch. Ill must be evaluated in the 
light of more detailed semantic information, especially of a larger array of 
paraphrase relations than we took into account in this study. Second, the formal 
properties of a syntax which takes hierarchies of minimal propositions as its 
input need to be studied. For, if after further semantic and psycholinguistic 
research the notion of hierarchies of minimal propositions still proves to be a useful 
one, then the following step will be to investigate the working principles of 
the syntactic operator. Finally, seeing the recent advances in the field of 
2) 
computer simulation of memory , and the potential practical usefulness 
engendered by computer storage and retrieval of verbal information, it is desirable 
to explore the extent to which the set-feature model lends itself to computer 
simulation. Such an attempt will also lead to a more exact formulation of the structure 
of the meaning memory. 
For a recently published survey of the literature, see Frijda, N. , La simulation 
de la mémoire, in La Мгтоіге, Symposium de l'Association de psyohologie 
scientifique de langue française, Paris: P.U.F., 1970. 
SUMMARY 
The present study is concerned with that part of the human language mechanism 
in which the meanings of words and sentences are stored. Our aim is the formulation 
and testing of a descriptive model for the memory representations of word and 
sentence meanings. In the development of this model, the following considerations 
have taken prime of place. (1) Word and sentence meanings are regarded as 
systems of interverbal relationships (intensional meaning). Consequently this 
study does not deal with extensional (denotative) or connotative meaning. (2) The 
representations of word and sentence meanings must show a logical structure so 
that logical thinking with the contents of the "meaning memory" is, in principle, 
possible. (3) These representations must not be in contradiction to already 
available experimental data on verbal (long-term) memory. (4) The memory representations 
of word and sentence meanings need to agree with available semantic-linguistic 
knowledge. This implies (a) that the representations of word meanings must show a 
componential structure, that is, can be regarded as sets of features, and (b) that 
the meaning relationships between sentence constituents (words, phrases) and between 
sentences (e.g. paraphrase relationships) must be adequately represented. In other 
words, memory representations of sentence meanings, as semantic representations of 
sentences, must be able to form part of a (to be constructed) competence model 
(grammar) in which sentences are generated from their semantic representations. 
In Chapter I we present a concise survey of the most important psychological 
theories of meaning and of Katz's semantic theory because this has exerted great 
influence on the development of componential meaning theories in psychology. Some 
theories (Skinner, Osgood , Katz) make explicit assumptions concerning the relation-
ship between verbal items and non-verbal processes considered necessary for the 
understanding of meanings, while others (Deese, Handler) hold open the possibility 
or deliberately restrict themselves to defining meanings as networks of interverbal 
relationships (cf. (I)). Since, however, the available empirical studies in the 
field of meaning determine, in actual fact, structures of interverbal relations, 
94 SUMMARY 
and since the nature of such processes has not been demonstrated, nor that they 
would be essential for understanding meanings, our proposed model remains confined 
to interverbal relationships in meaning memory. We hereby take into account as far 
as possible the requirements made under points 2,3 and 4. 
Chapter II expounds on the structural properties of this memory. The set-feature 
model presupposes a tnpartition of the human language mechanism word-form memory 
in which words of the language are phonologically represented, meaning memory which 
contains a great number of memory locations specifying connections of different 
kinds among word-forms in the word-form memory and among memory locations in the 
meaning memory itself, and the syntactic operator which acts as mediator between 
both the other parts, and among other things contains the syntactic information 
belonging to the word-forms. The organization of word-form memory and syntactic 
operator is not considered in this study 
Every location in the meaning memory constitutes a connection between (a) two 
word-forms, (b) one word-form and one memory location or between (c) two memory 
locations. If we let A and В stand for the connected entities, then memory locations 
of the types (a) and (b) also enclose a symbol indicating which of the following 
relationships holds A<rB or Bc_A Type (c) is reserved for indicating two-place 
relations (see below) and does not contain an inclusion symbol. Each word-form m 
the word-form memory is connected with a set of memory locations, each of these 
locations stands for one feature of the meaning of that word (see 4a). Presentation 
of a word to a subject results in activation of a subset of the set of memory 
locations which are connected to that word, and via this subset, of a number of 
other word-forms in the word-form memory. Which locations belong to this subset 
depends on their activation thresholds 
Chapter II is devoted to the memory representation of sentences of various syntactic 
structures sentences are considered as being built up from basic units which we 
have called minimal propositions (MPs) Examples of MPs which always include two 
content words are e.g. subject with nominal or adjectival predicate or with a verbal 
predicate based on an intransitive verb, adjective-substantive and adverb-verb 
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constructions. In the meaning memory, these occupy one memory location of the (a) 
type. Combinations of such constructions require memory locations of both the 
(a) and the (b) type, as, for example, the construction adjective-substantive-
intransitive verb. In this example: one (a) location for the adjective-substantive 
construction, and one (b) location which is connected to this (a) location and 
to the intransitive verb. We presume that all the words belonging to the word classes 
mentioned above, have as their denotation sets of objects, and that the above-
mentioned constructions specify subsets of sets; this is expressed by the inclusion 
symbol in both (a) and (b) locations. 
A special group of words (transitive verbs, prepositions, conjunctions) express 
two-place relations, that is, bring two subsets of the same or different sets in 
correspondence. This requires two memory locations of type (a) for the specification 
of sets and subsets and one location of type (c) where the correspondence is 
registered. For example, the verb invent in Pascal invented the calculator is 
connected with two sets of memory locations, viz. those which are also connected 
with the words inventor and invention. The sentence specifies Pascal and calculator 
respectively as subsets of these sets (represented by two (a) locations) and moreover 
the relation (correspondence; type (c)). Combinations of all these constructions in 
more complex sentences give rise in the meaning memory to hierarchical structures 
which represent "hierarchies of minimal propositions". 
In Chapter IV the relationships between the set-feature model and alternative 
theories on memory for words and sentences is investigated. With reference to work 
by Deese it is observed that the experimental determination of word meanings by 
means of collecting free associations (a specific type of interverbal relations) 
entails the limitation that the nature of the semantic relationships between stimulus 
and produced associations cannot show up. To meet this objection we suggest a 
procedure whereby the subjects produce as responses short sentences which indicate 
aspects of the meaning of the stimulus word. After this, the sentences can be analysed 
into MP hierarchies. It is furthermore borne out that the hierarchical memory 
structure proposed by Handler is realized in a specific manner in the set-feature 
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model. 
As regards the retention of sentences, we show that a number of phenomena that 
are generally ascribed to syntactic factors (transformational complexity, 
syntactic depth, constituent boundaries) either do not appear consistently or may 
be the result of non-syntactic and, more specifically of semantic factors. 
Emphasis is laid on experiments that support the psychological reality of constituent 
boundaries (Johnson); most of these data are meaningfully interpretable 
in terms of the set-feature model. 
Chapter V contains five experiments in which are tested hypotheses which are 
derived from the set-feature model and which are contrary to alternative theories. 
The experiment of § 1 is an association study which demonstrates that there is 
a relationship between the number of memory locations that have to be passed 
through from a given stimulus word to reach a certain response,and the associative 
reaction time. This phenomenon still stands if we regard only associations with 
equal associative frequency. As the basis for estimating the number of passed-through 
memory locations (distance) we make use of short sentences in which the subject 
had to render the meaning relationship between stimulus and response words. In fact, 
a classification is made into "short" and "long" distances, and this classification 
coincides with the distinction between hierarchic and relational structures 
respectively. If a sentence expresses that stimulus and response belong to the same 
hierarchy of higher (inclusive) and lower (including) concepts, then we speak of 
a hierarchic structure (this requires passing through at least one (a) location; 
short distance). If stimulus and response in this sentence are connected via a 
relation-indicating word (this requires at least three passed-through locations: 
(a)-(c)-(a)),then we speak of a relational structure. 
The difference in associative reaction time between stimulus-response pairs 
embedded in hierarchical and relational structures respectively is complemented 
in S 2 by a difference between the two types of association with respect to the 
tendency to clustering in "free recall". Here too the associative frequency was 
held constant. Both experiments lend support to an essential aspect of the set-
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feature model: the distinction between the memory representation of hierarchical 
and relational structures. 
With the aid of the same free-recall paradigm it is demonstrated in S 3 that 
verbs in sentence pairs with the same object show a stronger tendency to clustering 
than the verbs in sentence pairs with equal adverbial phrase· The sentences (apart 
from object and adverbial phrase) were identical. This result is predicted by the 
memory representation of both types of sentence: the distance in terms of the 
number of intervening memory locations is smaller for verb and object than for 
verb and adverbial phrase. 
In S 4 it is established, with the help of a modified version of the "archimedic" 
method developed by Savin and Perchonok, that the memory effort necessary for 
simultaneously retrieving the information from both (a) locations occupied by sentences 
of the structure subject-verb-object, is equal to the sum of the effort required 
for retrieving the information from each of the (a) locations separately (viz. one 
for the combination subject-verb and one for the combination verb-object). The 
experiment moreover demonstrates that learning the combination subject-verb (one 
(a) location) has a facilitating influence on subsequent retention of a sentence in 
which this combination is embedded. This is in conflict with Johnson's theory and 
data. 
The experiment in i 5 is concerned with the difference between transitive and 
intransitive verbs. Subjects memorize sentences containing a transitive or an 
intransitive verb; afterwards they are presented with the individual words 
and instructed to name as quickly as possible the next word of the sentence concerned 
(probe latency technique). (In the intransitive condition the object-noun was 
replaced as an adverb.) In connection with the double representation of 
transitive verbs (cf. the above example invent) the set-feature model predicts 
that after presentation of the subject-noun the reproduction of the verb will 
demand more time if this is transitive than if it is intransitive. This 
prediction is verified. 
The results of the first two investigations point to shortcomings in theories 
98 SUMMARY 
by Deese and by Mandler on verbal memory; the last three experiments (especially 
S 5) are hard to interpret with Johnson's model, and, more generally, with 
models based on "immediate constituent analysis". On the other hand they provide 
a good empirical basis for the set-feature model. 
We conclude that the set-feature model is a suitable basis for further research 
in the field of word and sentence meanings. Efforts should hereby be concentrated 
on research which, in comparison with the experiments reported here that took 
as starting point the memory representation of sentences, is more immediately 
directed towards the structural properties of meaning memory. 
SAMENVATTING 
Deze studie heeft betrekking op dat deel van het menselijke taaimechanisme 
waarin de betekenissen van woorden en zinnen zijn opgeslagen. Doel is het 
formuleren en toetsen van een descriptief model voor de geheugenrepresentaties 
van woord- en zinsbetekenissen. Bij de ontwikkeling van dit model hebben de 
volgende overwegingen vooropgestaan . (1) Woord- en zinsbetekenissen worden 
opgevat als systemen van interverbale relaties (intensionele betekenis). Deze 
studie handelt derhalve niet over extensionele (denotatieve) of connotatieve 
betekenis. (2) De representaties van woord- en zinsbetekenissen moeten een 
logische structuur vertonen, zodat logisch denken met behulp van de inhouden 
van het "betekenisgeheugen" in principe mogelijk is. (3) Deze representaties 
mogen niet in strijd zijn met de reeds beschikbare experimentele gegevens over 
het verbale (lange-tennijn) geheugen. (4) De geheugenrepresentaties van woord-
en zinsbetekenissen dienen overeen te stemmen met de voorhanden zijnde 
semantisch-linguistische inzichten. Dit impliceert (a) dat de representaties 
van woordbetekenisssen een componentiele structuur moeten vertonen, d.w.z. 
op te vatten zijn als verzamelingen (sets) van kenmerken (features), en 
(b) dat de betekenisrelaties tussen zinsconstituenten (woorden, zinsdelen) 
en tussen zinnen (o.a. parafraserelaties) adekwaat gerepresenteerd moeten 
zijn. Anders geformuleerd, de geheugenrepresentaties van zinsbetekenissen moeten 
als semantische representaties van zinnen onderdeel kunnen zijn van een 
(nader uit te werken) competentiemodel (grammatica) waarin zinnen worden 
gegenereerd vanuit hun semantische representaties. 
In Hoofdstuk I geven we een beknopt overzicht van de belangrijkste 
psychologische betekenistheorieën en van de semantische theorie van Katz 
omdat deze grote invloed heeft uitgeoefend op de ontwikkeling van componentiele 
betekenistheorieën in de psychologie. Sommige theorieën (Skinner, Osgood, 
Katz) maken expliciete assumpties omtrent de relatie tussen verbale items en 
non-verbale processen die nodig zouden zijn voor het begrijpen van betekenissen, 
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terwijl andere (Deese, Mandier) de mogelijkheid openhouden of zich bewust 
beperken tot het omschrijven van betekenissen als netwerken van interverbale 
relaties (vgl. (1)). Omdat de beschikbare empirische onderzoekingen op het 
gebied van betekenis in feite echter structuren van interverbale relaties 
vaststellen en omdat de aard van dergelijke processen niet is aangetoond en 
evenmin dat ze onmisbaar zouden zijn voor het begrijpen van betekenissen, 
blijft het dôor ons voorgestelde model beperkt tot interverbale relaties in 
het betekenisgeheugen. Hierbij houden we zoveel mogelijk rekening met de eisen 
gesteld onder punten 2 t/m 4. 
Hoofdstuk II bevat een uiteenzetting van structuureigenschappen van dit 
geheugen. Het set-feature model vooronderstelt een driedeling van het menselijk 
taaimechanisme: het woordvorm^geheugen waar de woorden uit de taal fonologisch 
gepresenteerd zijn; het betekenisgeheugen dat een groot aantal geheugenlocaties 
bevat die verbindingen van verschillende aard tussen woordvormen in het 
woordvormgeheugen tussen geheugenlocaties in het betekenisgeheugen zelf 
specificeren; de syntaktische operator die fungeert als medierende instantie 
tussen de beide andere onderdelen en, onder meer, de syntaktische informatie bevat 
behorende bij de woordvormen. De organisatie van woordvormgeheugen en syntaktische 
operator blijft in deze studie buiten beschouwing. 
Elke geheugenlocatie in het betekenisgeheugen vormt een verbinding tussen 
(a) twee woordvormen, (b) één woordvorm en één geheugenlocatie, ofwel (c) 
tussen twee geheugenlocaties. Als we de verbonden entiteiten aanduiden met 
A en B, dan bevatten geheugenlocaties van de typen (a) en (b) tevens een 
symbool dat aanduidt welke van de volgende logische relaties geldt: Ae=B 
of В*=A. Type (c) is voorbehouden voor het weergeven van tweeplaatsrelaties 
(zie beneden) en bevat geen inclusiesymbool. Iedere woordvorm uit het woordvormge­
heugen is verbonden met een verzameling van geheugenlocaties; elk van deze locaties 
vertegenwoordigt één kenmerk van de betekenis van dat woord (zie 4a). Presentatie 
van een woord aan een proefpersoon heeft tot gevolg dat een subset van de set 
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van geheugenlocaties die met dat woord zijn verbonden, geactiveerd wordt en 
vía deze subset, een aantal andere woordvormen uit het woordvormgeheugen. 
Welke locaties behoren tot deze subset hangt af van hun activatiedrempels. 
Hoofdstuk III is gewijd aan de geheugenrepresentatie van zinnen van uiteen-
lopende syntaktische structuur. Zinnen worden opgebouwd gedacht uit basis-
eenheden die we minimale proposities (MPs) noemen. Voorbeelden van MPs, die altijd 
twee inhoudswoorden bevatten, zijn o.a. onderwerp met naamwoordelijk gezegde of met 
een werkwoordelijk gezegde op basis van een intransitief werkwoord, adjectief-
substantief en adverbium-adjectief constructies. Deze bezetten in het betekenisge-
heugen éën geheugenlocatie van het type (a). Combinaties van dergelijke constructies 
vereisen geheugenlocaties van zowel type (a)als (b), zoals bijv. de constructie 
adjectief - substantief - intransitief werkwoord. In dit voorbeeld: éën (a)-
locatie voor de adjectief - substantief constructie, en één (b)- locatie die 
verbonden is met deze (a)- locatie en met het intransitieve werkwoord. 
We veronderstellen dat alle woorden die tot de hier genoemde woordsoorten behoren, 
verzamelingen van objecten als denotatie hebben en dat de vermelde constructies 
deelverzamelingen van verzamelingen specificeren; dit wordt uitgedrukt door het 
inclusiesyrabool in zowel (a)- als (b)- locaties. 
Een speciale groep van woorden (transitieve werkwoorden, preposities, voeg-
woorden) drukken tweeplaatsrelaties uit, d.w.z. brengen twee deelverzamelingen van 
dezelfde of verschillende sets met elkaar in correspondentie. Dit vereist twee 
geheugenlocaties van het type (a) voor specificatie van verzamelingen en deelver-
zamelingen, en ü n locatie van het type (c) waar de correspondentie wordt vastge-
legd. Bijv. het werkwoord uitvinden in Pascal vond de rekervnachine uit is verbon-
den met twee verzamelingen van geheugenlocaties, namelijk die welke tevens verbonden 
zijn met de woorden uitvinder en uitvinding. De zin specificeert resp. Fasoal en 
rekermaahine als deelverzamelingen van deze verzamelingen (gerepresenteerd door 
twee (a)- locaties) en bovendien de relatie (correspondentie; type (c)). Combina-
ties van al deze constructies in complexere zinnen leiden in het betekenisgeheugen 
tot hierarchische structuren die "hiërarchieën van minimale proposities" representeren. 
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In Hoofdstuk IV wordt het verband onderzocht tussen het set-feature model 
en alternatieve theorieën over het geheugen voor woorden en zinnen. Met be-
trekking tot het werk van Deese wordt vastgesteld dat de experimentele bepaling 
van woordbetekenissen door middel van het verzamelen van vrije associaties 
(een specifieke soort van interverbale relaties) de beperking inhoudt dat de 
aard van de semantische relaties tussen het stimuluswoord en de geproduceerde 
associaties niet aan de dag kan treden. Om aan dit bezwaar tegemoet te komen 
stellen we een procedure voor waarbij de proefpersonen als responses korte zinnen 
produceren die aspecten van de betekenis van het stimuluswoord weergeven. 
Deze zinnen kunnen daarna worden gearalyseerd in MP hiërarchieën. Verder blijkt 
dat de hierarchische geheugenstructuur voorgesteld door Mandier op een specifieke 
wijze in het set-feature model gerealiseerd is. 
Met betrekking tot het onthouden van zinnen tonen we aan dat een aantal ver-
schijnselen die worden toegeschreven aan syntaktische factoren (transformationele 
complexiteit, syntaktische diepte, constituentsgrenzen) ofwel niet consistent 
optreedt ofwel het gevolg kan zijn van met-syntaktische, en wel met name 
semantische factoren. Nadruk wordt gelegd op experimenten die de psychologische 
realiteit van constituentsgrenzen ondersteunen (Johnson); een groot deel van deze 
gegevens kan zinvol worden geïnterpreteerd door het set-feature model. 
Hoofdstuk V bevat een vijftal experimenten waarin hypothesen worden getoetst 
die afgeleid worden van het set-feature model en die in strijd zijn met alternatieve 
theorieën. 
Het experiment van § 1 is een associatiestudie die aantoont dat er een samen-
hang bestaat tussen het aantal geheugenlocaties dat moet worden gepasseerd om 
vanuit een gegeven stimuluswoord een bepaalde response te bereiken, en de 
associatieve reactietijd. Dit verschijnsel blijft optreden als we alleen 
associaties met gelijke associatieve frequentie in de berekening betrekken. Als 
basis voor de schatting van het aantal gepasseerde geheugenlocaties (afstand) 
maken we gebruik van korte zinnen waarin de proefpersoon de betekenisrelatie 
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tussen stimulus en responsewoorden moest weergeven. In feite wordt een indeling 
gemaakt in "korte" en "lange" afstanden, en deze klassificatie valt samen met 
het onderscheid tussen resp. hierarchische en relationele structuren. Wanneer de 
zin uitdrukt dat stimulus en response behoren tot dezelfde hiërarchie van hogere 
(insluitende) en lagere (ingesloten) begrippen, dan is sprake van hierarchische 
structuur (dit vereist het passeren van minimaal één (a)- locatie; korte afstand). 
Wanneer stimulus en réponse in de zin worden verbonden via een relatie-aandui-
dend woord (dit vereist minimaal drie gepasseerde locaties: (a)-(c)-(a)) dan 
spreken we van een relationele structuur. 
Het verschil in associatieve reactietijd tussen stimulus-response paren 
opgenomen in respectievelijk hierarchische en relationele structuren wordt in 
f 2 gecompleteerd door een verschil tussen de twee typen van associaties met 
betrekking tot de tendens tot groepering (clustering) in "free recall". Ook 
hier werd de associatieve frequentie constant gehouden. Beide experimenten 
verlenen steun aan een essentieel aspect van het set-feature model: het onderscheid 
tussen de geheugenrepresentatie van hierarchische en relationele structuren. 
Met behulp van hetzelfde free-recall paradigma wordt in S 3 aangetoond dat 
de werkwoorden uit zinsparen met gelijk object een sterkere groeperingstendens 
bezitten dan de werkwoorden uit zinsparen met gelijke adverbiale bepaling. 
De zinnen waren (behoudens object en adverbiale bepaling) identiek. Deze 
uitkomst wordt voorspeld door de geheugenrepresentatie van beide typen zinnen: 
de afstand in termen van het aantal tussenliggende geheugenlocaties is kleiner 
voor werkwoord en object dan voor werkwoord en adverbiale bepaling. 
In § A wordt aan de hand van een gemodificeerde vorm van de "archimedische" 
methode van Savin en Perchonok vastgesteld dat de geheugeninspanning die nodig 
is om de informatie uit beide (a)- locaties die worden bezet door zinnen van 
de structuur onderwerp - persoonsvorm - lijdend voorwerp tegelijkertijd op te 
halen, de som is van de inspanning vereist voor het ophalen van de informatie 
uit elk van de (a)- locaties afzonderlijk (nl. één voor de combinatie onderwerp-
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persoonsvorm en één voor de combinatie persoonsvorm - lijdend voorwerp). 
Bovendien laat dit experiment zien dat het leren van de combinatie onderwerp -
persoonsvorm (één (a)- locatie) een faciliterende invloed heeft op het 
onthouden van een zin waarin deze combinatie is ingebed. Dit is in strijd met 
de theorie en de data van Johnson. 
Het experiment van S 5 heeft betrekking op het verschil tussen transitieve 
en intransitieve werkwoorden Proefpersonen leren zinnen van buiten die een 
transitief of een intransitief werkwoord bevatten, en krijgen dan de afzonderlijke 
woorden aangeboden met de opdracht zo snel mogelijk het volgende woord uit de 
zin op te noemen (probe latency techniek). (In de intransitief - conditie 
werd het object - substantief vervangen door een adverbium.) In verband met de 
dubbele representatie van transitieve werkwoorden (vgl. bovenstaand voorbeeld 
uitvinden) voorspelt het set-feature model dat na aanbieding van het onderwerp -
substantief de reproductie van het werkwoord meer tijd zal vergen wanneer dit 
transitief is dan wanneer dit intransitief is. Deze predictie wordt bevestigd. 
De resultaten van de twee eerste onderzoekingen wijzen op tekortkomingen in 
de theorieën van Deese en Mandier over het verbale geheugen, de laatste drie 
experimenten (vooral 5 5) zijn moeilijk te interpreteren met het model van 
Johnson en, meer in het algemeen, met modellen die gebaseerd zijn op "immediate 
constituent analysis". Anderzijds verschaffen ze een goede empirische basis aan 
het set-feature model. 
We concluderen dat het set-feature model een geschikte basis vormt voor 
verder onderzoek op het gebied van woord- en zinsbetekenissen. Hierbij moet 
gestreefd worden naar onderzoek dat, m vergelijking met de hier gerapporteerde 
experimenten die geheugenrepresentaties van zinnen als uitgangspunt namen, meer 
rechtstreeks gericht is op de structuureigenschappen van het betekenisgeheugen. 
REFERENCES 
Alston, W., The Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1964. 
Berckel, J. van, Brandt Corstius, H., Mokken, R., Wijngaarden, A. van. Formal 
Properties of Newspaper Dutch. Amsterdam: Mathematisch Centrum Amsterdam, 
1965. 
Bierwisch, M., 'Some Semantic Universals of German Adjectivals > Foundations 
of Language, 1967, 3, 1 - 36. 
Bousfield, W., ' The Problem of Meaning in Verbal Learning', in Cofer, С (ed.), 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. 
Campbell, R. and Wales, R., 'Comparative Structures in English', Journal 
of Linguistios, 1969, 5, 215 - 251. 
Chomsky, N., Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957. 
Chomsky, N., 'Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior', Language, 1959, 35, 26 - 58. 
Chomsky, N., Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965. 
Chomsky, N.. 'Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation ', 
in Steinberg, D. and Jakobovits, L. (eds.). Semantics - An Interdisciplinary 
Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, Anthropology and Psychology, in press. 
Cofer, С , 'On Some Factors in the Organizational Characteristics of Free Recall', 
American Psychologist, 1965, 20, 261 - 272. 
Collins, Α.,and Quillian, R., 'Retrieval Time from Semantic Memory', Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1969, 8, 240 - 247. 
Cree Iman, Marjorie, The Experimental Investigation of Meaning. A Reiiiew of the 
Literature. New York: Springer, 1966. 
Deese, J., 'On the Structure of Associative Meaning', Psychological Review, 
1962, 69, 161 - 175. 
Deese, J., The Structure of Associations in Language and Thought. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. 
106 
Deese, J . , 'Association and Memory', in Dixon, T. and Horton, D., 1968. 
Dixon, T. and Horton, D. (eds.)> Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory. 
Englewood Cl i f f s , N . J . : Prentice-Hall , 1968. 
Fodor, J . and G a r r e t t , Μ., 'Some Syntactic Determinants of Sentential Complexity'» 
Perception and Psychophysios, 1967, 2, 289 - 296. 
Fr i jda, N., 'Towards a Model of Human Memory', Methodology and Science, June 
1969, 81 - 88. 
Fri jda, N. and Meertens, L., 'A Simulation Model of Human Information Ret r ieva l , ' 
in Symposion on the Simulation of Human Behavior. P a r i s : Dunod, 1967. 
Horowitz, L. and Prytulak, L., 'Redintegrative Memory . Psychologioal Revieu, 
1969, 76, 519 - 531. 
Jackendoff, R., 'Quantif iers in Engl i sh ' . Foundations of Language, 1968, 4, 
422 - 442. 
Johnson, N.. 'The Psychological Reality of Phrase-Structure Rules , Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1965, 4, 469 - 475. 
Johnson, N., 'The Influence of Associations between Elements of Structured 
Verbal Responses', Jowmal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1966, 
5, 369 - 374. 
Katz, J . , 'Analycity and Contradiction in Natural Language', in Fodor, J . and 
Katz, J . (eds.) The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of 
Language. Englewood-Cliffs, N . J . : Prent ice-Hal l , 1964 ( a ) . 
Katz, J . , 'Semantic Theory and the Meaning of 'Good' 1 , Journal o f Philosophy, 
1964 (b) , 61, 739 - 766. 
Katz, J . , The Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 
Katz, J . , 'Recent Issues in Semantic Theory', Foundations of Language, 1967, 
3, 124 - 194. 
Katz, J . and Fodor, J . , 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory', Language, 1963, 
29, 170 - 210. 
Katz, J . and Posta l , P . , An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions. 
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964. 
107 
Kraak, Α., Negatieve Zinnen. Een Methodologische en Gvammatieche Analyse. 
Hilversum: W. de Haan, 1966. 
Lakoff, G., 'Instrumental Adverbs and the Concept of Deep Structure',Foundations 
of Language, 1968, 4, 4 - 29. 
Lakoff, G., 'On Generative Semantics', in Steinberg, D. and Jakobovits, L. (eds.), 
Semantics - An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, Anthropology 
and Psychology, in press. 
Lyons, J., 'A Note on Possessive, Existential and Locative Sentences ', 
Foundations of Language, 1967, 3, 390 - 396. 
Lyons, J., Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968. 
Handler, G., 'Organization and Memory^ in Spence, K. and Spence, J. (eds.), 
The Psychology of Learning and IJotivation. New York: Academic Press, 1967. 
Mandler, G., 'Association and Organization: Facts, Fancies, and Theories', 
in Dixon, T. and Horton, D., 1968. 
Matthews, W., 'Transformational Complexity and Short Term Recall', Language and 
Speech, 1968, 11, 120 - 128. 
McCawley, J., 'The Role of Semantics in a Grammar', in Bach, E. and Harms, R. 
(eds,) Universale in Linguistic Theory. New York: Holt, 1968. 
McCawley, J., 'Where Do Noun Phrases Come from?' in Jacobs, R. and Rosenbaum, P. 
(eds.), Readings in English Transformational Grammar, in press. 
Mehler, J., 'Some Effects of Grammatical Transformations on the Recall of English 
Sentences', Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1963, 2, 346 - 351. 
Morton, J., 'Considerations of Grammar and Computation in Language Behavior', 
Studies in Language and Language Behavior, 1968, в, 499 - 545. 
Mowrer, o., 'The Psychologist Looks at Language't American Psychologist, 1954, 
9, 660 - 694. 
Noble, С , 'An Analysis of Meaning', Psychological Review, 1952, ЬЭ, 421 - 430. 
108 
Osgood, С , 'Comments on Professor Bousfield's Paper', in Cofer, C. ( e d . ) · 
Vevbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. 
Osgood, C , 'On Understanding and Creating Sentences', American Psycholoffist, 
1963, 18, 735 - 751. 
Osgood, C., 'Toward a Wedding of Insuf f ic iencies ' , in Dixon, T. and Horton, D., 
1968. 
P e r f e t t i , С , 'Lexical Density and Phrase Structure Depth as Variables in 
Sentence Retention' , Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1969, 
8, 719 - 724. 
P o l l i o , Η., The Struotural Basis of Word Association Behavior. The Hague: 
Mouton, 1966. 
Savin, H. and Perchonok, E., 'Grammatical Structures and the Immediate Recall of 
English Sentences', Journal of Verbal Learning and VeAal Behavior, 1965, 4, 
348 - 353. 
Skinner, В., Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. 
Suci, G., 'Relat ions between Semantic and Syntactic Factors in the Structuring 
of Language', Language and Speech, 1969, 12, 6 9 - 7 9 . 
Suci, G., Ammon, P. and Gamiin, P. , 'The Validity of the Probe-Latency Technique 
for Assessing Structure in Language', Language and Speech, 1967, 10, 69 - 80. 
Thomassen, Α., On the Representation of Verbal Items in Short-term Memory. 
Doctoral Disser ta t ion, University of Nijmegen, 1970. 
Tulving, E., 'Theoret ical Issues in Free Recal l ' , in Dixon, T. and Horton, D., 
1968. 
Uhlenbeck, E., 'An Appraisal of Transformation Theory', Lingua, 1963, 12, 1 - 18. 
Wilkes, A. and Kennedy, R., 'Response Latency and Syntactic S t r u c t u r e ' , paper 
presented to the 19 Internat iona l Congress of Psychology, London, 1969. 
Wright, P a t r i c i a , 'Sentence Retention and Transformation Theory', Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1968, 20, 265 - 272. 
Wright, P a t r i c i a , 'Two Studies of the Depth Hypothesis, British Journal of 
Psychology, 1969 ( a ) , 60, 6 3 - 6 9 . 
109 
Wright, Patricia, 'Transformations and the Understanding of Sentences', Language 
and Speech, 1969 (b), 72, 156 - 166. 
Yngve, V., 'A Model and an Hypothesis for Language Structure'» Proaeedings of 
the American Philosophical Society, 1960, 1043 444 - 466. 

KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT 
,x,CT™,.„ NIJMEGEN, 
INSTITUUT ' 
ALGEMENE TAALWETENSCHAP Wilh,lmü.«.loed 9 
Tel. 58711/2299 
^ ¿Tli Κίι р<і*і/«/££«-Л^*0 

STELLINGEN 
I 
In de totnutoe ontwikkelde theorieën over het verbale geheugen wordt 
onvoldoende onderscheid gemaakt tussen hierarchische en relationele 
opslagstructuren. 
II 
Het verdient de voorkeur semantische representaties in de vorm van 
n-plaatsrelaties, zoals deze in de generatieve semantiek recentelijk 
zijn ontwikkeld, te vervangen door hierarchische systemen van 
ëën- en tweeplaaterelaties. 
III 
De psychologische realiteit van de grens tussen het subjekt en het 
predikaat van een zin is in haar algemeenheid niet overtuigend aangetoond. 
IV 
Experimenteel onderzoek naar de invloed van syntaktische faktoren 
op het waarnemen en onthouden van zinnen wordt ernstig bemoeilijkt 
door het feit dat deze faktoren vrijwel niet los te koppelen zijn van 
semantische en informatietheoretische faktoren. 
V 
De resultaten die verkregen werden met computersimulatie van het 
semantische geheugen kunnen richting geven aan voortgezet onderzoek 
naar efficiënte systemen voor computeropslag van wetenschappelijke 
informatie en naar de daarbij passende ophaalstrategieën. 

VI 
In de nederlandse taalkunde is te weinig aandacht geschonken aan de 
mogelijkheid ош het meewerkend voorwerp van een zin onderwerp te 
maken via een transformatie die gebruik maakt van de antonymierelatie 
tussen de werkwoorden geven en krijgen. 
VII 
Onvoldoende beheersing van de fonologische component van de taal waarin 
het kind leert lezen, moet opgevat worden als de hoofdoorzaak bij het 
ontstaan van legasthenie. 
VIII 
Op korte termijn dient binnen de faculteit der sociale wetenschappen 
een interdisciplinaire afstudeerrichting Onderwijskunde ingesteld te 
worden die toegankelijk is voor kandidaten in de psychologie, pedagogiek 
en sociologie. 
XI 
Het psychologieonderwijs op niet-univereitair niveau is aan grondige 
vernieuwing toe omdat het vaak gegeven wordt door ondeskundigen en 
omdat de beschikbare leermiddelen over het algemeen sterk verouderd zijn. 
X 
Het oud-christelijke gebod dat men iedereen lief moet hebben is door 
latere moralisten zo geïnterpreteerd dat men ieder één lief moet hebben. 
Nijmegen, 12 juni 1970 G. Kempen 



